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STICKY EXPECTATIONS: RESPONSES TO




Most people underestimate the likelihood that they will experience negative
events and overestimate the likelihood that the law will protect them if those
events occur. Many of these mispredictions are highly resistant to change even
in the face of accurate and available information. This Article illustrates the
consequences of these "sticky" expectations using examples from marriage,
employment, and credit card regulation. In each of these areas, erroneous
expectations create costs. The largest and most common cost is the failure to
adequately self-insure against future negative events like divorce, job loss, or
high debt. But proposals for correcting irrational expectations can be costly, in
part because unrealistic optimism can also create benefits. This Article develops
a Calabresian cost-benefit framework to help us to assess those costs and benefits
sensibly, arguing that policy makers should seek to minimize the sum of the cost
of disparities between expectations and reality and the cost of reducing those
disparities. This approach can help to determine whether it is worth implement-
ing legal reform to close the gap between expectations and reality, and if so,
whether to do so by attempting to change the expectations or by changing the
law to correspond to existing expectations. This framework provides reasons to
rethink existing proposals aimed at informing or debiasing people through law.
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INTRODUCTION
Many people have erroneous beliefs about whether and under
what circumstances the law will shield them from the consequences of
a negative event. In some contexts, the vast majority of the population
systematically mispredicts both the content of the law and its likely
effects on their lives. Many of these mispredictions are highly resis-
tant to change even in the face of accurate and available information.
This Article illustrates the consequences of these "sticky" expectations
using examples from marriage, employment, and credit card regula-
tion. In each of these areas, erroneous expectations create costs. The
largest and most common cost is the failure to adequately self-insure
against future negative events like divorce,job loss, or high debt. This
Article develops a Calabresian cost-benefit framework to assess possi-
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ble legal responses to sticky expectations. This framework provides
reasons to rethink existing proposals aimed at informing or debiasing
people through law.
In many aspects of their lives, most people are irrationally opti-
mistic about their futures. They do not think that negative events will
happen to them,' and sometimes also believe that the law will protect
them if the negative event occurs. 2 For instance, couples entering
marriages radically underestimate their likelihood of divorce. 3 They
also radically overestimate the likelihood that, if they do divorce, the
law will provide a financial safety net for the poorer partner by award-
ing alimony.
4
This irrational optimism can create substantial costs. First, it
means that people do not adequately plan for divorce or other nega-
tive events, and fail to take steps that they might otherwise have taken
to insure against their costs. Divorce leaves many women substantially
poorer than they were during the marriage, 5 in part because they
often leave the workforce during marriage and thus have less post-
divorce earning potential. Had they been less optimistic during the
marriage, some of these women might have chosen to maintain their
work skills, thus self-insuring against the costs of divorce. Irrational
optimism can also inflict emotional costs: when expectations are frus-
trated, people experience needless emotional harm. Loss aversion
magnifies these harms-most people are extremely hesitant to accept
unexpected losses and will enter high-risk gambles in the irrational
hope of averting them. 6 These gambles often take the form of litigat-
ing weak claims, which impose unnecessary litigation costs on the par-
ties and the legal system.
7
I Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONAl-
maY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980).
2 See Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers'
Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 447, 465.
3 Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 439,
443 (1993).
4 See id.
5 See Richard V. Burkhauser et al., Wife or Frau, Women Do Worse: A Comparison of
Men and Women in the United States and Germany After Marital Dissolution, 28 DEMOGRA-
PHY 353, 356 tbl.1, 358 (1991).
6 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty, 5J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297, 298, 306, 312 (1992).
7 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAmES 473, 483-84 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
2000).
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Legal scholars have long recognized, of course, that people are
sometimes irrational. But they have too often assumed that the law
can change people's irrational expectations-and that doing so would
necessarily be a good thing.8 In reality, some expectations are highly
sticky even in the face of accurate contrary information. For instance,
informing people of the overall divorce rate and the relevant statistics
on alimony does not alter their optimistic predictions about their own
futures.9 Moreover, even when it is possible, correcting over-optimism
can impose collateral costs. For instance, optimism may itself be an
important ingredient of a successful marriage-and so correcting
couples' misperceptions may make marriages unhappier and divorce
more likely.10 A potentially discomforting conclusion emerges: a state
seeking to increase the welfare of its citizens might, in some situations,
have an interest in promoting misperceptions that stem from unrealis-
tic optimism.
This Article adapts Guido Calabresi's famous argument that the
law should minimize the sum of the cost of accidents and the cost of
preventing accidents.11 In the context of sticky expectations, the law
should again seek to minimize the sum of two costs: the cost of the
disparity between subjective expectations and reality, and the cost of
responding to that disparity. Policymakers could take one of three
general approaches in order to accomplish this goal. First, they could
pursue debiasing strategies; that is, they could attempt to correct the
erroneous expectations. Second, they could pursue insulating strate-
gies; that is, they could change the law to align it more closely with the
prevailing expectation or reduce the costs of the disparity in some
other way. Third, they could allow the disparity to persist. Each
choice carries costs. This Article focuses primarily on the costs and
benefits of debiasing strategies. It also offers preliminary thoughts on
several insulating strategies.
Sticky expectations predominantly result from optimistic biases.
Two such biases are particularly relevant to the examples in this Arti-
8 The traditional assumption in Law and Economics literature has been that
legal changes beget accurate changes in people's expectations. See RICHARD A. Pos-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (6th ed. 2003) ("The concept of man as a rational
maximizer of his self-interest implies that people respond to incentives-that if a per-
son's surroundings change in such a way that he could increase his satisfactions by
altering his behavior, he will do so."). For a discussion of specific proposals aimed at
changing expectations, see infra Parts III.A.4, III.B.4, III.C.4.
9 Baker & Emery, supra note 3, at 443.
10 See Sanjay Srivastava et al., Optimism in Close Relationships: How Seeing Things in a
Positive Light Makes Them So, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 143, 151 (2006).
11 See GuIDO CAIARESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970).
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cle. First, people tend to believe that they are less likely than the aver-
age person to experience negative events like divorce and job loss.
12
This tendency is especially pronounced when people perceive that
they have some degree of control over whether the negative event
occurs. 13 This pattern is generally referred to as the above-average
effect. Second, people tend to interpret ambiguous information in
self-serving ways and therefore become overly confident in their pre-
dictions. 14 This pattern is generally called the self-serving bias.
Some expectations are stickier than others. Their stickiness is
largely a function of their psychological source. The above-average
effect is difficult to correct. Because people do not feel that they are
average, providing information about the average person is seldom
useful. Even providing personalized risk information has only fleeting
and inconsistent effects on the strength of the above-average effect.1
5
Self-serving biases, on the other hand, may be easier to correct. Lab
studies show that people can be debiased by being forced to consider
other plausible interpretations of ambiguous information.
16
Although real-world expectations may be stickier, it is possible that
similar but intensified interventions could unstick them.
Although most sticky expectations result from a combination of
the above-average effect and the self-serving bias, in many situations
one of these two biases will play the dominant role. This will affect the
choice and potential effectiveness of debiasing strategies. For
instance, sticky expectations about marriage are primarily a reflection
of the above-average effect. Spouses accurately predict the probability
that the average person will get divorced, but believe that these statisti-
cal base rates are not probative of their own probability of divorcing.
17
Similarly, spouses accurately predict that courts usually do not award
alimony and yet also overwhelmingly predict that they will be among
the minority to benefit from this post-divorce safety net.18 Like all
above-average effects, these expectations are difficult to debias. And
as noted above, even if debiasing were possible in the marriage con-
text, it might not be advisable because preliminary data suggest that
12 Weinstein, supra note 1, at 810.
13 N.C. Higgins et al., The Controllability of Negative Life Experiences Mediates Unrealis-
tic Optimism, 42 Soc. INDICATORS RES. 299, 319 (1997).
14 See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The
Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 110 (1997).
15 See Matthew W. Kreuter & VictorJ. Strecher, Changing Inaccurate Perceptions of
Health Risk: Results from a Randomized Trial, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 56, 57, 61, 63 (1995).
16 Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 14, at 115.
17 See Baker & Emery, supra note 3, at 443.
18 See id.
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there is a causal relationship between optimism and long-term rela-
tionship satisfaction. 19
This analysis of marital optimism sheds light on the potential pit-
falls of a number of recent proposals. For example, Jeffrey Stake has
suggested making prenuptial agreements mandatory in order to skirt
the bluntness of a single default rule.20 To the extent that mandatory
premarital bargaining creates conflict and reduces marital optimism,
its cost may exceed its benefits. Similarly, proponents of premarital
counseling should carefully examine the content of these interven-
tions in order to ensure that they do not needlessly burden marital
optimism.
It may be possible to mitigate the costs of excessive marital opti-
mism (such as poor financial planning) without incurring the costs of
dissipating that optimism. To do so, policymakers should consider
insulating strategies rather than debiasing strategies. One such insu-
lating strategy would be to change the law to align it more closely with
prevailing expectations. That is, policymakers could consider chang-
ing the default rules of alimony to increase post-divorce income shar-
ing, helping fulfill spouses' expectations of long-term financial ties.
The framework produces different results in different contexts.
At-will employees overwhelmingly believe that they have broad legal
protections against termination. 21 They persist in this belief even
when they are told that their company expressly "reserves the right to
discharge employees at any time, for any reason, with or without
cause."2 2 This sticky expectation is primarily a consequence of self-
serving assumptions that arise in the face of ignorance. Here,
although the company's statement surely implies that at-will employ-
ment is legal, it does not explicitly say anything about the state of the
law. Most workers likely assume that the disclaimer must not be
legally enforceable. 23 Because this error results from self-serving
biases rather than the above-average effect, it may be susceptible to
relatively inexpensive debiasing. Unlike spouses, who have roughly
accurate beliefs about alimony law but are unrealistically optimistic
about their personal likelihood of receiving this legal protection, at-
will employees do not have accurate beliefs about the current state of
19 See Sandra L. Murray et al., The Benefits of Positive Illusions: Idealization and the
Construction of Satisfaction in Close Relationships, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 79,
92 (1996); Srivastava et al., supra note 10, at 144, 151.
20 Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397,
425-29 (1992).





law. The beliefs of at-will employees are therefore currently verifiable
in a way that the predictions of spouses are not. This has important
consequences for debiasing. Worker misperceptions can be corrected
through targeted transfers of information.
24
Debiasing at-will employees probably will not generate large col-
lateral costs. Better informed employees may feel less secure in their
jobs, which could carry emotional costs. But if so, employees will have
an incentive to bargain for more job protections. Although few
employees will be able to bargain for an individualized employment
contract, many will be able to bargain with their feet by moving to a
company that offers job security25 or to self-insure against potential
job loss in other ways. And to the extent that the loss of job-related
optimism hampers work productivity, employers too will have more
incentive to provide job protections. Put another way, if employees
and employers shared accurate information about the nature of the
employment relationship, they would be likely to bargain for terms of
that relationship that tend to maximize its benefits for both parties.
Employees' irrational optimism, on the other hand, creates an infor-
mation asymmetry that makes it less likely that the ultimate bargain
will be welfare-maximizing.
Again, this analysis sheds light on recent reform proposals. For
instance, Cass Sunstein and Cynthia Estlund have each independently
proposed shifting the default rule of employment from at-will to for-
cause. 26 Employees would only be able to waive for-cause protections
24 Many disclosure strategies, and in particular simple warning labels, have been
widely criticized in the legal literature as ineffective. See generally Howard Latin,
"Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1193, 1195
(1994). However, empirical examinations of even simple, static warning labels have
consistently concluded that warnings have useful-albeit modest-effects on behav-
ior. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Argo & Kelley J. Main, Meta-Analyses of the Effectiveness of Warn-
ing Labels, 23 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 193, 205 (2004) (examining forty-eight
studies and concluding that "[c] onsistent with Cox and colleagues' (1997) meta-anal-
ysis, the present research indicates that warnings influence behavior"); Eli P. Cox III
et al., Do Product Warnings Increase Safe Behavior? A Meta-Analysis, 16 J. PUB. POL'Y &
MARKETING 195, 198-99 (1997) (finding that warnings increased safe behavior in fifty-
three of seventy-nine experimental conditions, and overall warnings increased the
number of people engaging in safe behavior by eleven to twenty percent).
25 The best estimate available indicates that approximately fifteen percent of U.S.
firms voluntarily offer for-cause protections. J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspec-
tive on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L.
REv. 837, 867. If the demand for such protections grew, it is likely that more firms
would offer them, thereby increasing the likelihood that employees could bargain
with their feet.
26 Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It
Matter, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 6, 23-24 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the
2009]
740 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:2
if their waiver was "knowing and voluntary. '2 7 Their purpose is to cre-
ate a penalty-default rule that gives employers incentives to disclose
information about for-cause and at-will employment. In short, their
purpose is to debias. There are multiple reasons to doubt that this
debiasing method will be more effective than simple disclosures. For
example, the source of a disclosure is important to its credibility, and
at least in this narrow context the government is perceived as more
credible than a self-interested employer.28 A "knowing and voluntary"
standard will also create significantly higher litigation costs. The exact
contours of this standard are unclear, and even recent efforts to
define "knowing and voluntary" in a more systematic way fail to pro-
vide useful guidance to courts.29 Because the erroneous expectations
of at-will employees are rooted in a verifiable factual mistake, they
should be fairly easy to correct without recourse to amorphously
heightened standards of a "knowing and voluntary" waiver.
In addition to marriage and employment, sticky expectations are
likely to occur in the credit card context. It is likely that many credit
card consumers systematically underestimate their likelihood of bor-
rowing in the future, and overestimate the amount that they will repay
each month.30 These predictions are likely to be highly sticky because
they are rooted in an above-average effect. The strength of an above-
average effect is a function of perceived control. 31 Credit card con-
sumers have substantial control over how often they use their credit
card, and how much they repay each month. This nominal control
fosters overconfidence and leads a subset of credit card consumers to
accrue much more debt than they originally intended.
Over-optimism in relation to credit card debt poses different
challenges than over-optimism in marriage or employment. In the
context of marriage, individuals do not have the benefit of repeated
opportunities to learn, and one's first mistake may be very costly. Sim-
Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 231-32, 244 (2001) (quoting similar language
employed in the anti-discrimination context at 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2006)).
27 Estlund, supra note 26, at 23-24; Sunstein, supra note 26, at 244.
28 See Eli P. Cox III & Michael S. Wogalter, Warning Source, in HANDBOOK OF
WARNINGS 111, 119 (Michael S. Wogalter ed., 2006).
29 See infra notes 243-53 and accompanying text.
30 Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1375-76 (2004).
31 David Dunning et al., Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for Health, Education,
and the Workplace, 5 PSYCHOL. Sci. PUB. INT. 69, 80 (2004) ("One of the strongest mod-
erators of unrealistic optimism is perceived control. The greater a person's perceived
control over an event or its outcome, the stronger the person's optimistic bias." (cita-
tion omitted)); N.C. Higgins et al., supra note 13, at 319.
STICKY EXPECTATIONS
ilarly, people do not change jobs very often3 2 and therefore have lim-
ited opportunity to obtain feedback that counteracts their over-
optimism. In the credit card context, by contrast, individuals have the
opportunity to learn each time they receive their monthly statement.
3
3
But even if all consumers learn from their mistakes, this learning pro-
cess can be quite costly for a minority of credit card consumers. At its
extreme, increased debt leads to bankruptcy, and the increasing avail-
ability of consumer credit is at least partially responsible for the
increases in bankruptcy filings over the last fifteen years. 34
Because the majority of credit card consumers who accrue more
debt than they intend are likely to exhibit strong above-average
effects, existing disclosure-based proposals are likely to be ineffective.
Oren Bar-Gill has proposed providing credit card customers with indi-
vidualized predictions of how much they might borrow in the
future.3 5 However, similar interventions have been studied in the
public health context, and researchers have generally concluded that
providing individualized risk assessments has only a fleeting and
inconsistent impact on the above-average effect.
36
Insulating strategies-such as banning certain credit card terms
or imposing limits on interest rates-are not likely to produce signifi-
cantly better results. Policymakers need to be especially cognizant of
the collateral costs that regulations might impose on the bulk of con-
sumers who do not experience high costs from credit card debt. This
may be an area where some regulations can create net benefits, but
any intervention sweeping enough to prevent the costs of high debt
will probably come with unacceptably high collateral costs. If this is
the case, then policymakers should focus on reducing the costs of
32 See Robert E. Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 Am.
ECON. REv. 716, 716 (1982) (finding that more than twenty-five percent of workers
are in a job that will last twenty or more years).
33 See Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference Among
Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REv. 451, 473-78 (2008) (interviewing low-income
women who reported accruing substantial debt when they first obtained a credit card,
and who later adopted ways to limit the temptation to borrow).
34 See RONALDJ. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD 69 (2006) (reporting aggregate country
level data that suggests a link between increases in credit card debt and increases in
bankruptcies one to three years later); Robert M. Lawless, The Paradox of Consumer
Credit 63 (Univ. of IlL. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. LE06-
015, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=906868 (finding that increases in
credit card debt increase bankruptcy rates, but only when the debt surpasses a thresh-
old level).
35 Bar-Gill, supra note 30, at 1417-19.
36 Kreuter & Strecher, supra note 15, at 57, 61.
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learning in this context, and on creating structures that allow knowl-
edgeable consumers to implement their preferences.
3 7
Part I of this Article draws from a wealth of theoretical and empir-
ical literature on optimism biases to outline the sources of erroneous
expectations. Part II discusses various debiasing techniques and their
empirical support or lack thereof. It pays special attention to the
problems associated with debiasing heterogeneous populations that
are likely to contain people who are overly optimistic, people who are
perfectly rational, and people who are overly pessimistic. Part III
identifies sticky expectations in the contexts of marriage, at-will
employment, and credit card use, and assesses the viability of debias-
ing techniques in these case studies. It also offers preliminary
thoughts on several insulation strategies.
I. STICKY EXPECTATIONS
Sticky expectations predominantly result from optimistic biases.
Two patterns identified by the literature on optimistic biases are par-
ticularly relevant to the examples in this Article. First, people tend to
believe that they are less likely than the average person to experience
negative events like divorce and job loss.38 This pattern is generally
referred to as the above-average effect, although scholarship in eco-
nomics, psychology, and law has not yet coalesced around a uniform
term. Second, people tend to interpret ambiguous information in
self-serving ways and therefore become overly confident in their self-
serving predictions. This pattern is generally referred to simply as the
self-serving bias.
A. The Above-Average Effect, Comparative Optimism, and Overconfidence
"[P]eople have a pervasive tendency to believe they are better
than others in a multitude of ways and that life's negative events are
less likely to befall them than their peers. '3 9 Compared to others,
people overwhelmingly think that they are smarter, 40 better drivers, 41
37 For policy suggestions on dealing with the latter goal, see Littwin, supra note
33, at 470, 472 (noting that credit card consumers currently lack sufficient means of
implementing their desires to limit their access to easy credit as a self-control
mechanism).
38 See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 810 tbl.1.
39 John R. Chambers & Paul D. Windschitl, Biases in Social Comparative Judgments:
The Role of Nonmotivated Factors in Above-Average and Comparative-Optimism Effects, 130
PSYCHOL. BULL. 813, 813 (2004).
40 See Lauri Larwood & William Whittaker, Managerial Myopia: Self-Serving Biases in
Organizational Planning, 62J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 194, 196 tbl.1 (1977).
[VOL. 84:2
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better leaders, 42 better managers, 43 better workers, 44 healthier,45
more socially skilled, 46 more sensitive, 47 more ethical, 48 more charita-
ble, 49 more likely to vote,50 more productive, 5 1 and (ironically) less
susceptible to optimistic biases. 52  Similar tendencies exist both
among college students-the most commonly tested population-and
among the broader American population.53 This form of optimism is
commonly referred to as the "above-average" effect.
54
41 See David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic
Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES 324, 324
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
42 See id. (noting that seventy percent of students think that they are above aver-
age in leadership ability).
43 See Larwood & Whittaker, supra note 40, at 194 ("[M]anagement students con-
sistently overestimated their abilities; in a marketing exercise, they likewise indicated
that a hypothetical firm, of which they were sales managers, would quickly overtake
established competition.").
44 See Dunning et al., supra note 31, at 90.
45 See id. at 72 (reporting optimism in flu risk); Weinstein, supra note 1, at 810
tbl.1 (examining perceptions of risk for heart attack, lung cancer, cavities, and gum
problems).
46 See Dunning et al., supra note 41, at 324 (noting that twenty-five percent of
students believe that they are in the top one percent in their ability to get along with
others).
47 See Dunning et al., supra note 31, at 72 (reporting that sixty percent of students
felt that they were in the top ten percent in terms of interpersonal skills).
48 RAYMOND BAUMHART, AN HONEST PROFIT 20-24 (1968).
49 See Dunning et al., supra note 31, at 72.
50 See id.
51 See K. Patricia Cross, Not Can, But Will College Teaching Improve?, NEW DIREC-
TIONS FOR HIGHER EDUC., Spring 1977, at 1, 4 (reporting that ninety-four percent of
all college professors think that they do above average work).
52 Dunning et al., supra note 31, at 72; Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of
the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 785
(2004).
53 Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51
VAND. L. REv. 1653, 1660 (1998); see also Nathan M. Radcliffe & William M.P. Klein,
Dispositional, Unrealistic, and Comparative Optimism: Differential Relations with the Knowl-
edge and Processing of Risk Information and Beliefs About Personal Risk, 28 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 836, 839-40 (2002) (finding above-average effect in adult popu-
lations for health risks); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to
Health Problems: Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED. 481,
488-89 (1987) (analyzing over-optimism among eighteen to sixty-five year olds and
finding age correlated with the degree of a subject's over-optimism for only three out
of thirty-two hazards: insomnia, food poisoning, and deafness).
54 Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
199, 204 (2006). Because people selectively interpret information, they not only sys-
tematically underestimate their relative risk of experiencing a negative event, they
also underestimate their absolute level of risk. Id. at 204-05.
2009]
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People also think that they are less likely than others to experi-
ence heart attacks, 55 heart disease, 56 strokes, 57 skin cancer, 58 alcohol-
ism, 59  car accidents, 60  divorces, 6 1  unemployment, 62  unwanted
pregnancy,63 and criminal victimization. 64 This is sometimes referred
to as "comparative optimism" but it is in part another manifestation of
the above-average effect; people feel they are above average about
their ability to exert control over negative events. When they are
assured that a potential negative event is truly random, people exhibit
minimal above-average effects. 65 But when people have even a very
small amount of control over the negative event, such as being injured
in an earthquake, they exhibit unrealistic optimism. 66 The relation-
ship between optimism and control can also be seen on a global per-
sonality level. People who believe that they can control a wider variety
of events exhibit higher levels of unrealistic optimism, and people
who believe that they have little control have lower levels of unrealistic
optimism. 67 Overall, research has shown a strong and consistent link
between the above-average effect and perceptions of control.
68
Over-optimism is not limited to judgments about one's risk or
abilities relative to other people. It also affects judgments in a more
55 See Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to
Debiasing Interventions, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 132, 134 tbl.1 (1995).
56 Id. at 134-35.
57 Kreuter & Strecher, supra note 15, at 60.
58 Thomas A. Morton & Julie M. Duck, Communication and Health Beliefs: Mass and
Interpersonal Influences on Perceptions of Risk to Self and Others, 28 COMM. RES. 602,
610-11 (2001).
59 See Weinstein & Klein, supra note 55, at 135.
60 See id. at 134.
61 See Baker & Emery, supra note 3, at 444; Weinstein, supra note 1, at 810 tbl.1.
62 See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 810 tbl.1.
63 Jerry M. Burger & Linda Burns, The Illusion of Unique Invulnerability and the Use
of Effective Contraception, 14 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 264, 264 (1988).
64 See Linda S. Perloff & Barbara K. Fetzer, Self-Other Judgments and Perceived Vul-
nerability to Victimization, 50J. PERSONALrIY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 502, 504 tbl.1 (1986).
65 See Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimen-
tal Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 306, 308, 311 (1999).
66 Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, Changes in and Generalization of Unrealistic
Optimism Following Experiences with Stressful Events: Reactions to the 1989 California Earth-
quake, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 39, 41-43 (1992) (finding that students
did not exhibit over-optimism about the risks of natural disasters three days after a
major earthquake, but over-optimism returned three months after the quake).
67 Chambers & Windschitl, supra note 39, at 816.
68 Dunning et al., supra note 31, at 80 ("One of the strongest moderators of
unrealistic optimism is perceived control. The greater a person's perceived control




objective way. Self-assessments of intelligence, athleticism, work per-
formance, interviewing skill, ability to detect lies, knowledge, and abil-
ity to make accurate predictions have only a mild correlation with
performance when measured on objective scales. 69 The most studied
of these phenomenon is the tendency for people to exhibit overconfi-
dence in their ability to correctly answer general knowledge questions.
When people claim to be ninety percent sure of their answers to such
questions, they tend to be right between forty and seventy-five percent
of the time.70 This pattern also occurs when people are measuring
their confidence that one of their predictions will come true. For
example, when business school students indicated that they were one
hundred percent sure that they would receive more than a certain
number of job offers, they were correct only seventy percent of the
time.
71
The above-average effect and comparative optimism are specific
manifestations of an even larger set of optimism biases. For example,
the "attributional bias" describes people's tendency to attribute posi-
tive outcomes to their own skill while attributing negative outcomes to
bad luck or other external causes. 72 Beliefs about what is fair are also
highly influenced by the person's interests and powers. 73 Optimism-
related biases also affect the way that people collect and interpret
information, the predictions that people make, and the confidence
that people have in their predictions.
69 Id. at 71-72.
70 See Fergus Bolger & Dilek Onkal-Atay, The Effects of Feedback on Judgmental Inter-
val Predictions, 20 INT'LJ. FORECASTING 29, 30 (2004) (requesting that subjects create
ninety percent confidence intervals by choosing two bounds for a quantitative answer,
and finding that these bounds contained the correct answer only thirty-six to fifty-
eight percent of the time); Baruch Fischhoff et al., Knowing with Certainty: The Appro-
priateness of Extreme Confidence, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PER-
FORMANCE 552, 552 (1977) (finding that people who expressed a confidence of ninety
percent were right seventy-five percent of the time).
71 Stephen J. Hoch, Counterfactual Reasoning and Accuracy in Predicting Personal
Events, II J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 719, 722, 724
(1985).
72 Amy H. Mezulis et al., Is There a Universal Positivity Bias in Attributions? A Meta-
Analytic Review of Individual, Developmental, and Cultural Differences in the Self-Serving
Attributional Bias, 130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 711, 711 (2004) (collecting and analyzing 266
studies of the "attributional bias" and concluding that the effect is pervasive despite
being more severe in North America as compared with several Asian countries).
73 George Loewenstein & Don Moore, When Ignorance Is Bliss: Information
Exchange and Inefficiency in Bargaining, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 39-42 (2004).
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B. The Self-Serving Bias
Many people interpret information in self-serving ways. This is
commonly referred to as the self-serving bias. These patterns have
also been studied under the labels of cognitive dissonance and
schema reinforcement.7 4 The literature from each of these areas
comes to similar conclusions. When people search for information
from their memory or from the outside world, their "'search is biased
in favor of information that is consistent with [their] desired conclu-
sions.' ,,75 For example, in three studies of litigation-related bargain-
ing, subjects who were assigned the role of a plaintiff in a tort suit
assigned more importance to those facts that favored a large award for
the plaintiff.76 Subjects assigned the role of the defendant put greater
weight on facts that were favorable to them.
77
The results of these studies are not limited to inexperienced bar-
gainers in laboratory settings. Lawyers and professional negotiators
also exhibit self-serving biases. In one study of Pennsylvania labor
negotiations, teachers' unions and school board presidents separately
identified school districts as relevant "comparable" districts for pur-
poses of negotiating a labor contract. 78 This information was not
shared, so there was no incentive to select comparison schools strate-
gically.79 The wages at the schools picked by the union were modestly
higher than the wages at the schools picked by the school board presi-
dent.80 These modest differences produced large disagreements.
These differences were significantly related to the frequency of past
strikes. The authors estimated that a discrepancy in the estimation of
"comparable" wages of about $1000 annually (or about three percent
74 See Sandy L. Robinson, Trust and Breach of the Psychological Contract, 41 ADMIN.
Sci. Q. 574, 576 (1996) ("A long history of research on cognitive consistency and
attitude change has found that people act in ways that preserve their established
knowledge structures, perceptions, schemata, and memories.").
75 Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 14, at 114 (quoting Rasyid Sanitioso et al.,
Motivated Recruitment of Autobiographical Memories, 59 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
229, 229 (1990)); see also Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and Well-
Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL. BULL. 193, 194
(1988) ("'Instead of a naive scientist entering the environment in search of the truth,
we find the rather unflattering picture of a charlatan trying to make the data come
out in a manner most advantageous to his or her already-held theories."' (quoting
SUSAN T. FisKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 88 (1984)))
76 Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 14, at 114-15.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 116-17.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 117.
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of total salary) increases the risk of a strike by almost fifty percent
compared to a district where there is no discrepancy.
81
Self-serving biases can be sticky. Indeed, self-serving optimism
increases when people have more information.8 2 As the number of
plausibly relevant pieces of information increases, the number of
plausible interpretations often increases as well. People take advan-
tage of the ambiguity and "place great weight on evidence that is con-
sistent with desired outcomes while heavily discounting contrary
evidence."
83
II. A C RESIAN APPROACH
In 1970, Guido Calabresi published The Costs of Accidents. In it he
asserted that "the principal function of accident law is to reduce the
sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents."
84
Calabresi's simple formula mirrored more formal models of cost-ben-
efit analysis, and serves as a useful starting point for areas well outside
tort law.
In the context of sticky expectations, a Calabresian approach
would seek to minimize the sum of two costs: the cost of unrealistic
expectations, and the cost of responding to these unrealistic expecta-
tions. Policymakers could take one of three general approaches in
order to accomplish this goal. First, they could attempt to change
expectations. Because many of these erroneous expectations are
81 Id. For evidence that professionals are nonetheless less susceptible to biases
than other populations, see Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics,
and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lauryer, 76 TEX. L. REv. 77, 100-21 (1997)
(finding that lawyers were less susceptible than undergraduates to a host of biases
influencing their choice to settle a hypothetical case).
82 Dunning et al., supra note 41, at 328-29 (finding that as the available criteria
to evaluate one's performance increased from two to four to six to infinity, so did
above-average effect); Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpreta-
tions of Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 176, 188-89 (1992) (finding that increasing information provided to
unions and workers increases the discrepancy between their assessment of a fair com-
promise); Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-
Concept Maintenance 36-37 (Apr. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=979648 (finding that increasing the number of plausible
interpretations of their actions increases their tendency for deception, and that con-
versely, forcing them to list their own definition of honesty ex ante decreases dishon-
esty by decreasing their ability to fit a dishonest act into this definition ex post).
83 Dunning et al., supra note 41, at 325. This has led several scholars to criticize
broad discovery rules in civil litigation, which arguably create more ambiguity than
clarity about the strength of any particular lawsuit. See, e.g., Loewenstein & Moore,
supra note 73, at 50.
84 CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 26.
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caused by optimistic biases, this Article refers to these expectation-
altering interventions as debiasing strategies.8 5 Second, policymakers
could change one or more relevant legal rules to reduce the costs that
result from sticky expectations. This Article refers to such interven-
tions as insulating strategies. Third, policymakers could allow the dis-
parity to persist. Just as not all accidents are worth preventing, not all
sticky expectations are worth unsticking. The choice between these
three options will depend on how harmful the sticky expectation is,
how sticky it is, and whether responding to it would impose collateral
costs.
Unlike many of his successors in the law and economics move-
ment, Calabresi concluded that people might deviate in systematic
ways from the behavior of a purely rational actor, and that enough
people might do so to justify regulation.
[E]ven if individuals had adequate data for evaluating the risk [of
an accident], they would be psychologically unable to do so. The
contention is that people cannot estimate rationally their chances of
suffering death or catastrophic injury. Such things always happen
to "the other guy," and no amount of statistical information can
convince an individual that they could happen to him.
8 6
Although the current behavioral law and economics literature sug-
gests that this quote may be too strong and too broad, Calabresi basi-
cally intuited the above-average effect and comparative optimism.
Drawing on the research on cognitive biases that has now forcefully
entered the legal academy, this Article focuses on a subset of ques-
tions relevant under the Calabresian framework: whether sticky expec-
tations can be altered by legal intervention, and if so whether such
debiasing would create more costs than benefits.
A. Debiasing Strategies
The above-average effect is difficult to correct. Because people
do not feel that they are average, providing information about the
average person is seldom useful.8 7 When people are simply told that
85 The terms "debiasing strategy" and "insulating strategy" are borrowed from
Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 54, at 201, 207.
86 CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 56.
87 See AlexanderJ. Rothman & Marc T. Kiviniemi, Treating People with Information:
An Analysis and Review of Approaches to Communicating Health Risk Information, 25 J.
NAT'L CANCER INST. MONOGRAPHS 44, 45 (1999) (citing William M. Klein & Ziva
Kunda, Maintaining Self-Serving Social Comparisons: Biased Reconstruction of One's Past
Behaviors, 19 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 732, 732-39 (1993); AlexanderJ.
Rothman et al., Absolute and Relative Biases in Estimations of Personal Risk, 26J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1213, 1213-36 (1996)).
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the average person has a certain risk of being in a car accident, having
a heart attack, getting an STD, being a victim of burglary, having a sick
pet, or getting cancer, most presume that they are above average at
taking preventative measures and therefore reduce their risk assess-
ment from this baseline.18
Disclosures can be partially successful at increasing risk awareness
when people are given the likelihood of experiencing the event if they
are a person with above-average protective traits (for example, good
driving skill, consistent condom use, responsible about locking doors
or taking care of pets, etc.). s9 When given such a "conditional base
rate," many people concluded that they were similar to the above-aver-
age person and adopted this estimate of their risk without altering it.9°
For example, one study assessed subjects' perceived risk of ever get-
ting into an auto accident on a snowy road.91 One group of subjects
was given a conditional base rate for a person with above-average driv-
ing skill and another group of subjects was given a base rate for the
average driver. Subjects given the conditional base rates were more
likely to exhibit some above-average effect, but the average magnitude
of that effect was lower.92 On balance, it is not clear whether it would
be better to have a larger number of moderately optimistic people or
a smaller number of highly optimistic people. Therefore, this method
of disclosure does not provide policymakers with any clear solution.
Even providing individual customized risk information does not
necessarily reduce the above-average effect for any length of time. In
one particularly striking study, people were asked to rate their relative
risk of having a heart attack, stroke, fatal car accident, and getting
cancer. 93 They were also asked questions about their physique, health
status, health behaviors, and family history of diseases. These
responses were used to calculate an actuarial estimate of their mortal-
ity risk, which was given to them after their initial predictions. In a six-
month follow-up, optimism for some risks increased, while for others
it decreased or remained stable.94 In a similar study, people were
tested and told whether they were above average, average, or below
88 See Carla C. Chandler et al., It Can't Happen to Me ... Or Can It? Conditional Base
Rates Affect Subjective Probability Judgments, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 361,
365-67 (1999).
89 See id. at 369.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 363.
92 See id. at 365-67.
93 Kreuter & Strecher, supra note 15, at 57.
94 Id. at 61-62.
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average regarding their risk of heart attack.95 In a follow-up seven to
twelve weeks later, most people retained their unrealistic optimism.96
Only twenty-one percent of people who were told that they had an
above average risk of heart attack increased their personal risk assess-
ment.97 Twelve percent of these people actually lowered their per-
sonal risk assessment.98 Overall, these studies suggest that actuarial
information will have some effects, but these effects are inconsistent
and ephemeral.99
Although the above-average effect is fairly resistant to change, it is
easier to limit the effect that self-serving biases have on how people
interpret potentially ambiguous information. For example, in an
effort to prevent people from interpreting information in self-serving
ways in the litigation context, Linda Babcock and George Loewenstein
attempted to implement three debiasing strategies. 100 The basic study
assigned subjects to the role of plaintiff or defendant in a tort suit,
then asked them to read the facts and predict how the judge would
rule within a range between $0 and $100,000.101 Plaintiffs systemati-
cally predicted larger awards than defendants. 10 2 Their first debiasing
effort required subjects to read a paragraph about the self-serving bias
before they made their prediction.10 3 This had no effect on their pre-
dictions.1 0 4 Another group of subjects wrote an essay making the best
case for their opponent. 0 5 This strategy was counterproductive, and
increased the gap between plaintiffs' and defendants' predictions. 0 6
A third group of students read a paragraph about the self-serving bias,
and then listed the weaknesses of their own case. 10 7 Although this
95 Meg Gerrard et al., The Effect of Risk Communication on Risk Perceptions: The Sig-




99 See Nancy E. Avis et al., Accuracy of Perceptions of Heart Attack Risk: What Influences
Perceptions and Can They Be Changed?, 79 Am.J. PUB. HEALTH 1608,1611 (1989) (find-
ing that actuarial risk feedback led many people at high risk of heart attack to
improve the accuracy of their perceptions, but cautioning that twelve percent of these
high risk subjects developed even greater levels of unrealistic optimism after the
feedback).
100 See Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 14, at 115-16.
101 Id. at 112.
102 Id. at 113.
103 Id. at 115.
104 Id. ("When they learned about the bias, subjects apparently assumed that the
other person would succumb to it, but did not think it applied to themselves.").
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 115-16.
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final debiasing strategy merely combined one ineffective treatment
with one counterproductive treatment, it worked. (This highlights
the idiosyncratic nature of biases and debiasing techniques, and cau-
tions against making generalizations without testing them.) The
plaintiffs and defendants in this group still made divergent predic-
tions, but these predictions only differed by an average of $4674.108
This was much lower than the average discrepancy that emerged in
the absence of any debiasing attempts: $21,783.109 Many other studies
have confirmed these general results and found that people are less
prone to self-serving predictions when they are forced to confront
plausible arguments that cut against their conclusion. 110
Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein have recently proposed explor-
ing the possibility of using some cognitive biases to counteract
others.111 This strategy has the theoretical potential to counteract the
above-average effect, comparative optimism, and overconfidence.
They note that it may be possible to correct these biases by using the
availability heuristic to induce an equal and opposite judgment error.
The availability heuristic refers to the tendency of people to overesti-
mate the likelihood that particularly vivid and salient events will
occur.112 Such vivid mental images are more "available" when people
make judgments, and therefore have a disproportionate impact on
them.113 The Canadian government has recently used the availability
heuristic in a fairly successful attempt to reduce smoking.' 14 Instead
of including a warning label composed of words, cigarette packs now
bear graphic pictures of infected lips and gums. 1 1 5 In addition to
108 Id. at 116.
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., Edward R. Hirt et al,, Activating a Mental Simulation Mind-Set Through
Generation of Alternatives: Implications for Debiasing in Related and Unrelated Domains, 40J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 374, 377-379 (2004) (finding that basketball enthusiasts
who were induced to think that the Portland Trailblazers would win the champion-
ship subsequently reduced their estimate of the probability that they would win after
considering whether the Lakers would win instead).
111 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 54, at 210-11; see also Kim Witte & Mike Allen, A
Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeals: Implications for Effective Public Health Campaigns, 27 HEALTH
EDUC. & BEHAV. 608, 615-16 (2000) (noting the general effectiveness of fear as a tool
for behavioral change).
112 Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 685 (1999).
113 See id. (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982)).
114 D. Hammond et al., Impact of the Graphic Canadian Warning Labels on Adult
Smoking Behaviour, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 391, 391 (2003).
115 Id. at 391-92.
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images, narrative stories also tend to be more "available" than general
statistics. Thus, a personalized story about one man's battle with can-
cer is likely to have a large effect on risk perceptions.1 16 It may be
possible to customize this story so that it provides just the right coun-
terbalance to over-optimism.
As the authors acknowledge, this strategy is fraught with practical
difficulties. First and foremost, balancing one bias against another
may require an enormous amount of fine-tuning. Although they note
that using narratives to influence risk perceptions "avoids the diffi-
culty of coming up with an accurate numerical probability estimate"' 17
of the population's risk, it creates other problems. Narratives are
composed of inriumerable elements. Small changes in the story might
change its "availability." These changes might also cause it to be more
"available" for some subpopulations than others. Thus, small changes
must be tested within a number of sub-communities. Given that no
one has begun to explore these issues empirically, it is too soon to
determine whether this is a plausible debiasing strategy.
The second difficulty with using the availability heuristic to coun-
terbalance over-optimism is that the cure may be worse than the dis-
ease. Even if a well-calibrated narrative corrects for the average
amount of over-optimism, people may differ widely in their levels of
optimism. People who do not suffer severe over-optimism may be
induced to overestimate their risk after reading the narrative.' 18 This is
not a problem in all contexts. In the context of smoking, Canada may
have concluded that the only optimal level of smoking is zero. There-
fore, it would not be concerned about whether formerly rational
smokers now overestimate their risk of smoking. In most contexts,
however, the goal is not to make all people as pessimistic as possible
but rather to increase the accuracy of their predictions. This requires
eliminating exaggerated optimism without creating exaggerated
pessimism.
Jolls and Sunstein acknowledge the potential to introduce pessi-
mistic biases into the portion of the population that, pre-intervention,
116 George Loewenstein et al., Statistical, Identifiable, and Iconic Victims, in BEHAV-
IORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 32, 33 (EdwardJ. McCaffery &Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) ("Sev-
eral lines of research have shown that individual cases motivate people more
powerfully than statistics, even when the latter are objectively more informative.").
117 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 54, at 212 (citing Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security
Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1459-60 (1983)).




was accurately calculating their risk.1 9 They note that this would not
occur if optimistic biases and susceptibility to the availability heuristic
tend to co-occur. 120 If all of the people who used the availability heu-
ristic also suffered from optimism bias, then vivid narratives could
debias without being underinclusive. If all of the people who were
immune from over-optimism were also immune from the effects of
the availability heuristic, then vivid narratives could debias without
being overinclusive. Unfortunately there is no data on whether the
various types of bounded rationality tend to co-occur. Until this data
is collected and analyzed, we cannot know whether this strategy will
create more problems than it will solve.
The challenges of debiasing a heterogeneous population are not
only present for Jolls and Sunstein's suggested strategy, but are
endemic to all debiasing techniques. Research on heuristics and
biases has largely focused on reporting overall averages. These aver-
ages may mask a lot of underlying variation. 12 1 For example, within a
population that exhibits a self-serving bias overall, one quarter of peo-
ple may exhibit a severe bias, while another quarter exhibits mild bias,
and the remainder exhibit no bias at all. Broadly speaking, there are
two sources of this heterogeneity. First, these differences might stem
from personality traits or individual dispositions. I refer to this as dis-
positional heterogeneity. Similarly, there may be particular situations
in which people exhibit stronger self-serving biases, and situations in
which no one exhibits a bias. I refer to this as situational heterogene-
ity. These two assuredly interact in much the same way that nature
and nurture interact (some people may be dispositionally prone to
exhibit a bias in certain situations but not in others). Nonetheless, it
is useful to speak of them as separate types of heterogeneity.
1. Dispositional Heterogeneity
Policymakers could potentially address dispositional heterogene-
ity by first sorting people into groups that are more and less likely to
119 Id. at 229.
120 Id. at 229-30.
121 Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics'Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded
for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 86 n.46 (2002)
(" [B]ecause behavioral decision researchers are interested primarily in finding devia-
tions from norms of procedural rationality by any statistically significant percentage of
subjects (that is, they seek to find nonrandom deviations from the neoclassical eco-
nomic model, and a small percentage who deviate may suffice for purposes of statisti-
cal analysis), an experiment often will be portrayed as having found some 'systematic
non-rational tendency' even though less than half of the subjects provided the nonra-
tional response in the experiment.").
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exhibit a strong bias, and targeting their efforts on the former. Some
researchers have attempted to conduct dispositional sorting, with little
success. Studies have identified few observable traits that correlate
with either the above-average effect or the degree to which people
interpret ambiguous information in self-serving ways.
Neil Weinstein, a pioneer of optimism and debiasing research,
examined the correlation between the above-average effect and vari-
ous demographic variables. He found that the above-average effect
does not vary across sex, age, occupation, or educational
attainment.122
Similarly, there are few observable demographic variables or per-
sonality traits that can be used to identify people with a propensity to
interpret ambiguous information in self-serving ways. In two negotia-
tion studies, subjects interpreted a set of facts after being assigned a
particular role as a union worker or a manager. 123 Both studies gener-
ated similar results. Subjects exhibited self-serving biases when they
produced estimates of what a fair wage would be. 124 They also exhib-
ited self-serving biases when they rated the importance of various
facts; they tended to rate facts as more important if they supported
their desired outcome. 125 The author went on to examine individual
differences in the magnitude of these two effects. There were no con-
sistent patterns in how a host of personality traits-self esteem, moti-
vation to achieve, self-consciousness, depression, locus of control,
need for cognitive closure, or empathy-related to subjects' judgment
of what a fair wage would be. 126 Competitive individuals and men
showed a somewhat greater propensity to selectively weight facts that
were favorable to their position, but no other correlations were
significant.
Overall, dispositional sorting appears to be implausible at this
time. Jeffrey Rachlinski recently surveyed the literature on disposi-
tional heterogeneity and concluded that no reliable and easily visible
traits have yet been identified to allow dispositional sorting. 127 It is
122 See Weinstein, supra note 53, at 489.
123 Robert D. Yonker, Individual Differences and Egocentrism in Negotiations:
Who Is Most Likely to Exhibit the Bias? 25-26 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Missouri, St. Louis).
124 See id. at 36 fig.1.
125 See id. at 36.
126 See id. at 55-59.
127 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207, 224 (2006) (finding that cognitive ability, education, training,




possible that researchers will locate identifiable and accurate proxies
for these biases, but until they do so dispositional sorting will remain
only a theoretical possibility.
2. Situational Heterogeneity
Most of the research on biases and heuristics has reduced situa-
tional heterogeneity by placing subjects in a common situation and
asking whether they, on average, exhibit a bias.1 28 Most debiasing and
insulation strategies are similarly situational. Consumer protection
laws, for example, tend to be specific to one domain. There are sepa-
rate statutes that govern disclosure requirements in the context of
credit cards, stocks, tobacco, and ladder purchases. I29 Although inter-
est group pressures assuredly contributed to this fractured regulatory
regime, these regulations have the added benefit of reducing situa-
tional heterogeneity.
Instead of analyzing optimism in all its manifestations, this Article
takes advantage of situational heterogeneity to identify areas where
optimism is particularly prevalent and particularly costly. For exam-
ple, more than half of all people report that they have no chance of
ever divorcing-that is, they have a zero percent chance of experienc-
ing divorce.1 30 Eighty-nine percent of male and ninety-five percent of
female college students think that they will never divorce.1 31 These
numbers are staggering, especially given that most people predict that
fifty percent of all couples divorce.1 32 In the employment context, at
least sixty percent of workers erroneously believe that they have broad
legal protections against being fired.I 33 Because both divorce and job
loss are costly, failing to insure against them can be particularly harm-
ful. In the context of credit cards, there is less data about how many
consumers exhibit over-optimism, and how costly these biases might
be. Luckily, policymakers can sometimes make informed decisions
128 See, e.g., supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
129 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 7 7g, 1637 (2006).
130 See Baker & Emery, supra note 3, at 443; Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few
PrenuptialAgreements? 9 (Harvard Law Sch.John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus.
Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 436, 2003), available at http://sr.nellco.org/
harvard/olin/papers/436.
131 How College Women and Men Feel Today About Sex, Aids, Condoms, Marriage, Kids,
GLAMOUR, Aug. 1987, at 261, 263 [hereinafter Women and Men] (finding that only
eleven percent of college men and five percent of college women thought that they
would ever get a divorce), cited in Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern
Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 687, 700 n.48.
132 Baker & Emery, supra note 3, at 443; Mahar, supra note 130, at 9.
133 See Kim, supra note 2, at 465.
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even when they only have partial information about biases and their
costs.
B. Regulating in the Face of Limited Knowledge: Asymmetric Paternalism
A number of scholars have argued that, when the pattern of
biases within the population is unknown, policymakers should only
consider "asymmetrically paternalistic" debiasing or insulation tech-
niques.13 4 A technique is asymmetrically paternalistic if it has large
benefits for biased people, but imposes little cost on unbiased peo-
ple. 135 For example, cooling-off periods for important contracts (like
buying cars or getting married) may help impulsive people avoid hasty
decisions while imposing only a small cost on rational actors.
136
Under this guideline, an intervention is likely to be welfare-enhancing
even if there are relatively few biased individuals.
But asymmetrically paternalistic interventions are not the only
ones that fit the framework that these scholars create. They adopt a
standard welfare-maximizing analysis.1 37 They argue that the benefits
of the intervention to the biased group must outweigh the costs of the
intervention to the nonbiased group. Specifically their formula is that
an intervention is cost effective when
(p*B) - ((1 - p)*C) - I> 0
where p equals the proportion of people that exhibit the bias, B
equals the benefits to each person that exhibits the bias, C equals the
costs of the intervention to each person that does not exhibit the bias,
and I equals the costs of implementing and maintaining the
intervention.13
8
When put into words, this formula is quite simple. It asks
whether the benefits (p*B) outweigh the sum of two costs: the direct
cost of implementing the intervention (1), and any collateral costs
that the intervention may impose on unbiased people ((1 -p)* C).1 39
134 See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics
and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism, " 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211, 1212 (2003).
135 Other scholars have referred to this as "cautious paternalism." See, e.g., Edward
J. McCaffery &Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public Finance, in BEHAV-
IORAL PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 116, at 3, 13.
136 See, e.g., Camerer et al., supra note 134, at 1338-39 (discussing the costs of
cooling-off periods).
137 See id. at 1251.
138 Id. at 1219.
139 This formula assumes that any legal intervention will have only positive effects
for the biased population. This Article does not make this assumption, and instead
considers the possibility that an intervention will be a mixed blessing even for the
people it is intended to benefit.
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These scholars then conclude that, if p is unknown, the probability
that the benefits of a regulation will outweigh its costs is greater when
B is large and C is small. 140 Regulating under these circumstances
would be asymmetrically paternalistic because the benefits (B) to the
biased population (p) are high and the costs (C) to the unbiased pop-
ulation (1-p) are low. 14 1 Therefore, policymakers might still be able
to sensibly impose a regulation even if they cannot assess all of the
relevant facts (here, the proportion of the population that suffers
from a bias).
Although these scholars did not address other potential uses of
their formula, it generates guidelines in other situations of partial
ignorance. If p is known to be high-that is, if a large proportion of
an identifiable population suffers from a bias-then C can approach
and even surpass B before regulation would be unjustified. Put
another way, when policymakers know that a large portion of the pop-
ulation suffers from a costly bias, they can be fairly certain that an
intervention is cost-justified even if they do not know the extent of the
costs that the intervention will impose on the unbiased minority.
Thus the formula not only justifies asymmetric paternalism but also
much more invasive forms of paternalism, provided that a large pro-
portion of the population suffers from a bias. At a minimum, the bur-
den of persuasion shifts in these situations to those wishing to show
that an intervention will carry too many collateral costs. As discussed
in the case studies, this and similar welfare-maximizing formulas can
justify aggressive interventions.
III. CASE STUDIES
A. Marriage and Divorce
1. Evidence of Sticky Expectations
Marriage is perhaps the quintessential context in which people
are unrealistically optimistic, and this optimism is highly resistant to
change. Couples exhibit at least three overlapping above-average
effects that prevent them from accurately assessing the likelihood and
potential consequences of divorce.
First, people are notoriously over-optimistic about the probability
that they will live happily ever after. Both men and women believe
that fifty percent of marriages end in divorce. 142 More than half, how-
ever, predict that there is no chance that they will divorce, that is, that
140 Camerer et al., supra note 134, at 1219.
141 Id.
142 Baker & Emery, supra note 3, at 443; Mahar, supa note 130, at 9.
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their probability of divorcing is zero.1 43 Even those that predict that
there is some chance that they will divorce tend to be highly optimis-
tic. On average, people predict that their chance of getting a divorce
is about ten percent.144 This optimism obviates any incentive to learn
about the rules of divorce or to retain any information about them.
Second, even when people are forced to consider the possibility
that they will divorce, they are overly optimistic that a court will award
alimony in their case. Most people, including new spouses, tend to be
adequately informed about the basic rules of divorce, but extremely
optimistic about how those rules would apply to them. For example,
newly married spouses predict that courts award alimony in forty to
fifty percent of cases. 145 Yet over eighty percent of them predict that a
court would award alimony in their case.
14 6
Third, spouses overestimate the likelihood that their spouse
would, in the event of divorce, comply with court ordered support.
14 7
New spouses accurately predict that twenty percent of women who are
awarded alimony never collect a cent. 148 Nevertheless, one hundred
percent believed that their spouse would pay every penny.1
49 Simi-
larly, they predict that only forty percent of exes collect all of their
court-ordered child support, while ninety-eight percent simultane-
ously believe that they themselves would collect the full amount.
50
The Calabresian approach requires that policymakers not only
know what proportion of the population exhibits a bias, but also the
costs that the bias creates. This Article does not attempt to calculate
the overall costs of unrealistic optimism in the marriage and divorce,
143 Baker & Emery, supra note 3, at 443 (finding that more than half of people
who had recently applied for a marriage license felt that they would never divorce);
Mahar, supra note 130, at 9 (finding that for both law students and the general popu-
lation, the median person predicted that they had a zero percent chance of
divorcing).
144 Mahar, supra note 130, at 15 (finding that law students estimated their risk of
divorce at seventeen percent, while the general population estimated their risk at ten
percent); Women and Men, supra note 131, at 263 (finding that only eleven percent of
college men and five percent of college women thought that they would ever get a
divorce).
145 Baker & Emery, supra note 3, at 443. This estimate is over-optimistic. See CARL
E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW 329 (3d ed. 2006)
("In 1984, 30% of wives were awarded alimony when both parties were represented by
counsel, while not one alimony award was made when neither party was represented
by counsel.").
146 Baker & Emery, supra note 3, at 443.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 442.
149 Id. at 443.
150 Id.
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although it offers reasons to believe that the cost is likely to be high.
Instead this Article focuses principally on the second question rele-
vant to the Calabresian framework: whether the law could reduce opti-
mism bias, and whether reducing optimism is likely to have adverse
collateral consequences. I conclude that debiasing would be difficult,
and that the collateral costs of debiasing would be high. Therefore,
policymakers should consider insulating strategies. Although I do not
undertake a full cost-benefit analysis of various insulating strategies, I
offer some preliminary thoughts. Specifically, I argue that the costs of
shifting the legal rule to align with existing expectations are probably
relatively low and asymmetrically paternalistic: a default rule that
increased post-divorce income would likely have substantial benefits
for unrealistically optimistic spouses without imposing substantial
costs on realistic spouses.
Most spouses probably underinsure against the possibility of
divorce. Currently, the law does not reflect spousal expectations of
having a lasting marriage or a lasting financial tie even after divorce.
All states allow unilateral divorce.1 5 1 Alimony is rare.' 52 Most states
give great weight to exes' autonomy interests in moving on with their
lives without financial obligations toward one another. 153 These states
have adopted a "clean break" theory of divorce that focuses on settling
all financial disputes at the time of divorce so that such aspects of the
marital relationship are severed.154 Because people erroneously
believe that the law will provide a safety net for the poorer spouse, this
spouse will probably underinsure against the financial costs of divorce.
The failure to insure against divorce is likely to create substantial
costs. First, the very fact that spouses with more realistic expectations
might choose to insure against the costs of divorce suggests that there
is a deadweight loss: there are welfare-enhancing transactions that are
not occurring because of sticky expectations. Second, the distribution
of assets upon divorce creates costs even if a spouse would not have
151 See Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence,
and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 719, 723.
152 See SCHNEIDER & BRINIC, supra note 145, at 329 (noting that, in 1984, thirty
percent of wives received alimony payments when both parties were represented by
counsel); Kathrine C. Daniels et al., Alternative Formulasfor Distributing Parental Incomes
at Divorce, 27 J. F~A. & ECON. ISSUES 4, 6 (2006) (collecting studies and noting that
spousal support is only awarded in ten to fifteen percent of cases).
153 The conception of autonomy that these states adopt is, of course, debatable.
They view autonomy negatively, as freedom from restraint. But autonomy can also be
seen positively, as a right to have the means to pursue your goals. Understood in both
of these ways, autonomy would require the courts to balance a high wage earner's
negative autonomy against a low wage earner's positive autonomy.
154 See Scott, supra note 131, at 704-05.
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rationally insured against this potential loss. After a divorce, ex-wives
and children tend to have lower standards of living than they had dur-
ing the marriage, 155 while husbands enjoy higher standards of liv-
ing. 156 These gains and losses do not offset one another; even a
traditional welfare maximizer who is only interested in maximizing
aggregate utility would not be indifferent to this particular change in
the distribution of assets. 157 In a wide variety of realms people exhibit
loss aversion; the loss of a good is felt more deeply than the gain of a
similar good. 158 This is likely to occur not only for individual goods,
but for the aggregation of goods and services that collectively create a
standard of living. Therefore, when divorce shifts resources from the
wife to the husband, the husband's gain will not offset the wife's loss.
For a long time, common law courts acted on an intuitive understand-
155 Burkhauser et al., supra note 5, at 356.
156 In total, women tend to be much poorer after divorce than before. See id.
(reporting that between a quarter and a third of women experience a fifty percent
decline in their standards of living after divorce or separation); Daniels et al., supra
note 152, at 19-20 (collecting studies showing that ex-wives suffer a larger financial
loss at divorce, while ex-husbands realize a gain in their standard of living).
157 There are, of course, other normative commitments besides efficiency that are
relevant to the distribution of assets upon divorce. The fact that efficiency analysis
ignores these issues is both a weakness and a strength. The most often cited norma-
tive commitment relevant to the distribution of assets upon divorce is a Lockean labor
theory of property under which people who contribute to creating wealth should have
an ownership interest in it. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17
(Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690) ("The labor of his body and
the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out
of the state that nature has provided... he has mixed his labor with, andjoined to it
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property."). This commitment
does not produce clear guidance in the case of divorce. Many scholars have argued
that our current system of distributing assets upon divorce violates this contribution
theory by failing to recognize the contributions of wives; others however, disagree.
Compare MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER 144-61 (1999) (discussing the trend
toward contribution theories in alimony and evaluating various ways of implementing
this theory), Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinc-
tion, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79, 101-03 (2001) (analogizing marriage to a business
partnership), and Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as Suckers: Pity, Partnership, and Divorce
Discourse, 90 IowA L. REV. 1513, 1550-52 (2005) (same), with Allen M. Parkman, The
Recognition of Human Capital as Property in Divorce Settlements, 40 ARK. L. REV. 439, 448
(1987) (concluding that normally "the investment in human capital prior to marriage
will be so large and essential relative to the investment after marriage that an individ-
ual's human capital should be treated as separate property"). An analysis based on
welfare maximization is impoverished to the extent that it ignores this and other nor-
mative commitments. However, it is useful for the same reason: it sidesteps discus-
sions of normative commitments that, as applied at least, do not yield any clear
consensus.
158 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 481-83.
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ing of loss aversion in the context of marriage by seeking to maintain
ex-wives in the style of living to which they had become
accustomed.159
2. Is Debiasing Possible?
As discussed above, there are few debiasing strategies that have
shown promise in reducing the above-average effect. 160 Even expo-
sure to an entire semester of family law-with its traditional focus on
divorce law and divorce statistics-does not reduce unrealistic marital
optimism among law students.
1 6'
To the extent that marital over-optimism is the result of self-serv-
ing biases, however, debiasing may be possible. Self-serving biases may
play a role in marital optimism if, for example, spouses interpret
ambiguous actions of their spouses as supportive and caring. 162 Recall
that subjects tend to be significantly less biased in their predictions
when they are asked to list reasons why their prediction might be
incorrect.1 63 This pattern was evident in predictions of litigation out-
comes,1 64 sports outcomes, 165 and one's own skill. 166 Combined,
these studies suggest that this debiasing technique is fairly
generalizable.
Unfortunately, it is not clear how effective this debiasing strategy
will be in the real world. The subjects of these studies were predomi-
nantly students solving problems in a lab. They had only a minimal
stake in the outcome, and had not invested any effort or money into
their position. Engaged couples are in a vastly different position.
They have already invested substantially in the relationship, and their
judgment is likely to be affected by these sunk costs. As Ward Farns-
worth has noted: "The self-serving biases that infect real parties with
deep investments in their positions may well be more robust, making
superficial exercises [like listing counterarguments] .. . less likely to
be effective."'
167
159 See REGAN, supra note 157, at 141-44.
160 See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
161 See Baker & Emery, supra note 3, at 448.
162 See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
163 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
164 See Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 14, at 115-16.
165 See Hirt et al., supra note 110, at 379.
166 See A. Peter McGraw et al., The Affective Costs of Overconfidence, 17 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 281, 288-89 (2004).
167 Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
567, 583 (2003) (discussing the self-serving bias in the context of litigants).
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Even if superficial interventions are unlikely to work, the effec-
tiveness of any intervention is probably a function of how demanding
it is and how often it is repeated. In the context of marriage, the law
could theoretically require that people undergo premarital counsel-
ing in order to obtain a marriage license. 168 This counseling could
require that couples learn about optimism biases and confront chal-
lenges that their marriage might face, and perhaps even reasons why
their marriage may fail. Although a single instance of listing the rea-
sons why one's marriage could fail may have little effect, it is plausible
that repeated exercises and discussions about the difficulties of mar-
riage could reduce over-optimism. In short, unrealistic marital opti-
mism may be correctable, but it is likely to be expensive to correct.
3. Collateral Costs of Debiasing
Even if the law could reduce unrealistic marital optimism, doing
so is likely to have substantial collateral consequences. Unrealistic
optimism creates benefits, in addition to its costs. On a global level,
unrealistic optimism correlates with happiness. 169 More specifically,
couples who score high on composite measures of optimism are more
satisfied with their relationship and stay together longer. In one rep-
resentative study, partners who were more optimistic at the beginning
of the experiment were more satisfied with their relationship two
years later. 170 This correlation persisted even after controlling for self-
reported initial relationship quality. 171 Similar studies have suggested
that early optimism increases relationship duration. 172 Although
these studies do not directly speak to the effects of optimism on rela-
tionships longer than two years, they suggest that optimism creates
benefits, even when it is unrealistic.
173
168 Louisiana already requires such counseling for couples who choose to enter
into a "covenant" marriage. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (2006).
169 Jolls, supra note 53, at 1661.
170 See Kimberly K Assad et al., Optimism: An Enduring Resource for Romantic Rela-
tionships, 93 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 285, 292 (2007).
171 Id.
172 See, e.g., Srivastava et al., supra note 10, at 151 (finding, after controlling for
initial relationship satisfaction and a host of personality traits, that seventy-five per-
cent of couples with men at or above-median optimism were still together, whereas
only fifty-four percent of couples with men at below-median optimism were still
together).
173 See Murray et al., supra note 19, at 92 (finding that partners were more satisfied
in relationships when they had inaccurate favorable views of their partners' traits);
William B. Swann, Jr. & Michael J. Gill, Confidence and Accuracy in Person Perception: Do
We Know What We Think We Know About Our Relationship Partners?, 73J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 747, 747 (1997) ("[C]onfidence [about how well you know your part-
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The positive effects of optimism in relationships appear to be
mediated by perceptions of support. People who are generally opti-
mistic in life are more likely to interpret ambiguous actions of their
partner as nurturing and supportive. 174 When conflicts occur, opti-
mistic couples see each other as engaging in more productive conver-
sations.1 75 This explanation comports with research on optimism in
other areas. For patients with mild health problems, optimism and
the perception of control over the disease improves coping, speeds
recovery, and reduces symptoms. I 76 Unrealistic optimism even has
benefits for patients recovering from major surgery177 or coping with
serious diseases. For example, HIV-positive men tend to be more opti-
mistic than HIV-negative men about eventually developing AIDS. 178
This is clearly unrealistic. However, this unrealistic optimism is associ-
ated with more productive coping techniques and more health-pro-
moting behavior. 179 In general, dispositional optimism is also related
to feelings of control, which are in turn associated with better stress
management, less pain, less disability, and reduced depression. 80
These studies do not show that optimism can cure cancer or prevent
ner] may sometimes contribute to relationship quality even when it is unrelated to
accuracy.").
174 Assad et al., supra note 170, at 285 (reporting on the effect of dispositional
optimism on relationship satisfaction and duration, and finding that it was mitigated
by perceptions of support); Srivastava et al., supra note 10, at 143, 147 (same).
175 Srivastava et al., supra note 10, at 143, 147.
176 Michael F. Scheier & Charles S. Carver, Optimism, Coping, and Health: Assessment
and Implications of Generalized Outcome Expectancies, 4 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 219, 233-44
(1985).
177 See Michael F. Scheier et al., Dispositional Optimism and Recovery from Coronary
Artery Bypass Surgery: The Beneficial Effects on Physical and Psychological Well-Being, 57 J.
PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 1024, 1029-30 (1989).
178 Shelley E. Taylor et al., Optimism, Coping Psychological Distress, and High-Risk
Sexual Behavior Among Men at Risk for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 63 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 460, 463 (1992).
179 Id. at 470-72.
180 For a review of several of these studies, see Michael F. Scheier & Charles S.
Carver, Dispositional Optimism and Physical Well-Being: The Influence of Generalized Out-
come Expectancies on Health, 55 J. PERSONALITY 169, 173-81 (1987); Shelley E. Taylor &
Jonathon D. Brown, Positive Illusions and Well-Being Revisited: Separating Fact From Fic-
tion, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21, 23 (1994) ("[E]xperiments conducted in medical settings
clearly demonstrate that people who believe they have control during stressful proce-
dures cope better than those undergoing the same procedures but not exposed to
control-enhancing interventions, as indicated by a broad array of physiological,
health-related, and affective measures; these effects occur even when that 'control' is
largely perceived rather than actual.").
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the onset of AIDS, 18 1 but they do suggest that optimism (even if
unrealistic) significantly improves the quality of life that patients expe-
rience by improving their ability to cope.'8 2
Although the above studies dealt with overall dispositional opti-
mism, it is likely that marriage-specific optimism has even more bene-
ficial effects on marital satisfaction and duration. When people
believe that they were "made for each other" they will be more likely
to interpret ambiguous actions of their spouses as supportive, loving,
and endearing. Optimistic couples who have a strong (even if unreal-
istic) sense of control over their marital happiness are also likely to
cope with conflict more productively. The aftermath of a serious con-
flict within a marriage is likely to create stress and trepidation about
how long the healing process will take. If optimism and perceptions
of control help surgery patients recover faster, and help HIV-positive
men to cope with the limitations of their lifespan, they are likely to
help couples recover faster from disagreements, and cope better with
those rifts that never quite heal. A welfare-maximizing state may
therefore have an interest in increasing rather than reducing unrealis-
tic marital optimism, at least if it can also insulate individuals from the
ex post costs of this optimism.
The high cost of debiasing strategies-both in terms of imple-
mentation costs and potential collateral effects of decreased opti-
mism-suggests that policymakers should consider insulation
strategies. This Article briefly explores one such strategy: policymak-
ers could alter default divorce laws to better reflect the prevailing
expectations of engaged couples.
Many commentators have argued that divorce law should aban-
don its current "clean break" philosophy and instead maintain a finan-
cial link between exes after divorce. The specific policy proposals all
share the same elements: (1) substantial post-divorce income sharing
based merely on the fact of marriage rather than on need, and (2) a
reduction of this sharing over time in order to allow the exes to (even-
tually) terminate their obligations to one another.183 Using the ali-
181 See Brian D. Doan & Ross E. Gray, The Heroic Cancer Patient: A Critical Analysis of
the Relationship Between Illusion and Mental Health, 24 CAN. J. BEHAV. Sci. 253, 262-63
(1992).
182 See Frode Thuen &Jostein Rise, Psychological Adaptation After Marital Disruption:
The Effects of Optimism and Perceived Control, 47 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCHOL. 121, 126
(2006) (finding that optimism is strongly correlated with emotional adaptation after a
divorce).
183 See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Prop-
erty Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2389 (1994) ("[S]pouses' lives have been intertwined
in ways that the logic of this rhetoric cannot fully capture. The extent of this interde-
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mony regime as an insulation strategy forces the wealthier spouse to
bear the cost of his or her partner's unrealistic optimism. Policymak-
ers could instead spread these costs over the entire population. For
example, they could use general tax revenue to fund job training pro-
grams for divorcees who did not work during a marriage, or they
could create other social safety nets specific to divorce. However,
assigning the costs to the wealthier spouse has two advantages, one
welfarist and one rooted in notions of autonomy. First, tying the
financial fortunes of spouses together increases incentive for each of
them to maximize their joint marital surplus.'8 4 Second, the vast
majority of prospective spouses believe that a court will award alimony
in their case.' 8 5 Therefore, the existence of a robust alimony scheme
was probably an integral piece of the bargain that they struck when
they were married. Under autonomy theories of contract, the law
should enforce this bargain in order to respect the autonomous
capacity of each person to make choices for themselves.
8 6
Changing the default rule of divorce would be an example of
asymmetric paternalism. It would affect those couples who have a
severe optimism bias more than it affects other couples. Overly opti-
mistic couples will not adequately prepare for divorce because they
expect that they will share in each other's income for an indefinite
period of time. The proposed alimony rule enforces this expectation
to a great degree. Couples who are not optimistic are in a much bet-
ter position to contract out of the default rule, whether through pre-
nuptial or postnuptial agreements.
Even if this default rule is costly to contract around, and there-
fore not asymmetrically paternalistic, it could still be justified. Recall
that asymmetric paternalism is a rule of thumb for those cases where a
pendence is roughly a function of how long individuals are married. As a result, we
might require that ex-spouses share the same standard of living for some period of
time corresponding to the length of their marriage."); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform
and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. Riw. 1103, 1117-18 (1989) (proposing a limited-term
alimony that would continue for one year for each two years of marriage); Starnes,
supra note 157, at 1551 (urging an analogy of marriage law and the law of business
partnerships, and arguing that income sharing should continue until the tasks of the
partnership are completed: namely, until the youngest child reaches the age of major-
ity);Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227,
2229, 2258 (1994) (advocating alimony payments until the youngest child leaves the
home and an arbitrary number of years has passed).
184 See Antony W. Dnes, The Division of Marital Assets Following Divorce, 25 J.L. &
SoC'Y, 336, 339-43 (1998) (discussing incentive effects of various rules of post-divorce
property distribution).
185 Baker & Emery, supra note 3, at 443.
186 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACr AS PROMISE 9-17 (1981).
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policymaker does not know what proportion of the population suffers
from a given bias. As discussed above, marital optimism is widespread
and severe.18 7 This optimism has costs. Divorce substantially reduces
the standards of living of ex-wives and their children. These losses are
not offset by the husband's corresponding gains. 188 Because opti-
mism is widespread and costly, policymakers concerned with maximiz-
ing welfare have wide latitude to impose costs on the small minority of
people that do not exhibit marital optimism. This lends even further
support for shifting the default rule to increase post-divorce income
sharing.
4. Alternate Proposals
The Calabresian framework also sheds light on other family law
proposals. Jeffrey Stake has expressed doubt that any single default
rule can accommodate the diversity of couples that seek to marry. He
has therefore suggested mandatory prenuptial agreements. 189 Stake's
concern with spousal diversity is well founded. Couples may have vary-
ing ideas about what marriage means, and what obligations it should
entail. The growing number of prenuptial agreements, postnuptial
agreements, and people who opt out of marriage entirely suggests that
there is demand for some customization within marriage. 190 Merely
providing the opportunity to people to write prenuptial agreements is
not an effective way of allowing such customization because people
are too optimistic to consider their need for one, and engaged
couples are concerned that bringing up the idea of a postnuptial
agreement will send a distrustful and damaging signal to their pro-
spective spouse.191 Mandatory prenuptial agreements at least partially
overcome the problems of optimism and signaling concerns that pre-
vent most couples from considering prenuptial agreements.
Mandating prenuptial agreements may partially debias couples.
The extent of this debiasing, however, is difficult to estimate based on
current research. When couples consider the terms of their own
divorce, they are likely to view it as a more realistic possibility. If they
readily agree on all terms, and therefore are not forced into serious or
lengthy discussions, then this debiasing effect is likely to be negligible.
187 See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
189 Stake, supra note 20, at 425-29.
190 See Rebecca Glass, Trading Up: Postnuptial Agreements, Fairness, and a Principled
New Suitor for California, 92 CAL. L. REV. 215, 218 (2004) ("Both [prenuptial and post-
nuptial] agreements are increasingly popular means by which parties allocate assets
during marriage and plan for property distribution at the time of death or divorce.").
191 See Mahar, supra note 130, at 16-18.
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However, when couples must debate and compromise about the terms
of their divorce, they are likely to experience greater debiasing.
This debiasing may have collateral costs. If mandating prenuptial
agreements erodes marital optimism, then it may also weaken mar-
riages. Stake acknowledges that mandating prenuptial agreements
has drawbacks: 'just in the rare and fleeting moment of giddy, feet-off-
the-ground, reckless abandon, the state steps in and bursts the balloon
with a dose of practicality."' 92 However, he only focuses on the imme-
diate hedonic costs that stem from this rude intervention. He over-
looks the potentially significant ripple effects that lower optimism may
have on relationship satisfaction and duration. 193 The possibility of
such ripple effects suggests that policymakers should first explore
strategies that do not risk these collateral costs, such as extending
post-divorce income sharing.
B. Employment Contracts
Most workers appear to have unrealistic expectations about their
job security. Although these misperceptions are sticky, they are
rooted in the self-serving bias rather than an above-average effect and
so debiasing is probably possible. Other interventions, such as requir-
ing employees to "knowingly and voluntarily" waive for-cause employ-
ment, could also debias workers, but these would probably create
unnecessary litigation costs.
1. Evidence of Sticky Expectations
In the vast majority of states, at-will employment is the norm
194
and employees are only protected against being fired for a narrow
class of reasons, such as their race, age, sex, or whistle-blowing activi-
ties. 195 However, most employees think that it would be illegal for
their employer to fire them for a host of additional reasons. Pauline
Kim studied the beliefs of people in New York, California, and Mis-
192 Stake, supra note 20, at 447.
193 See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
194 Montana is the lone exception. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (2007).
There is a pending proposal to return to an at-will default rule. H.B. 513, 60th Leg.,
Res. Sess. (Mont. 2007); David H. Autor et al., The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws 2
n.1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W9425, 2002), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/W9425.pdf.
195 See Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions,
MONTHLY LAB. REv.,Jan. 2001, at 3, 4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohib-
its employment discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
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souri who were filing for unemployment insurance.' 96 They were
asked whether an employee with no formal employment contract
could be fired so that their employer could hire someone who would
work for a lower wage. 197 The law in all three states is clear. In the
absence of a contract the employee would be terminable at will.1 98 A
cost-saving termination would be legal under an at-will rule. It would
also be legal under the stricter "for cause" standard. 199 The vast
majority of Kim's subjects-over eighty percent-thought that it
would be illegal for a company to fire an employee in order to hire




These beliefs were sticky. Three-quarters of these people per-
sisted in this error even after they were informed that the company
handbook stated: the Company "reserves the right to discharge
employees at any time, for any reason, with or without cause."'201 Pre-
sumably, these people believed that state or federal law prevented
employers from entering into at-will contracts with their employees,
rendering this disclaimer moot.202 This degree of misunderstanding
is particularly noteworthy because Kim's subjects-who were recently
fired-presumably had a large incentive to learn about the law sur-
rounding terminations both before and after they were terminated.
196 Kim, supra note 2, at 449.
197 Id. at 459.
198 See id. at 471. In one case, the court even held that an express for-cause clause
in a contract did not overcome Missouri's strong presumption in favor of at-will
employment. See Main v. Skaggs Cmty. Hosp., 812 S.W.2d 185, 189 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991).
199 Even Montana's broad for-cause protections would not apply to the situation in
Kim's study. In Montana, a termination is legal if it is based on "a reason that is
neither false, whimsical, arbitrary or capricious, and it must have some logical rela-
tionship to the needs of the business." Buck v. Billings Mont. Chevrolet, Inc., 811
P.2d 537, 540 (Mont. 1991). The cost-saving termination in Kim's study almost cer-
tainly had "some logical connection to the needs of the business" and therefore would
be legal.
200 Kim, supra note 2, at 463 n.55. Similar results were reported by Richard Free-
man and Joel Rogers, who found that workers erroneously believe that employers
cannot hire strike breakers, cannot force workers to perform dangerous jobs, and
cannot fire workers arbitrarily. RiCHARD B. FREEMAN &JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS
WANT 118-22 (1999).
201 Kim, supra note 2, at 465.
202 See Robert F. Wayland et al., Employment-at-Will Statements: Perceptions ofJob Appli-
cants, 14 INT'LJ. MANPOWER 22, 28 (1993) (finding that fifty-eight percent of students
entering the work force thought that an explicit at-will waiver would not be enforcea-
ble even if signed by the employee).
STICKY EXPECTATIONS
The self-serving bias helps explain why workers might confuse
aspirational norms of employer etiquette and law.20 3 When these
norms favor employees, and when employees don't specifically know
the content of the law, they are likely to fill in their knowledge gaps in
self-serving ways.
There are few opportunities for employees to correct these erro-
neous beliefs. If workers feel secure, they are more likely to invest in
company-specific skills.204 Therefore, when an employee is fired the
employer has an incentive to make it look like it was for cause even if
it was not, so as to prevent other employees from feeling insecure.
Even when employers don't make deliberate attempts to mischaracter-
ize an arbitrary termination, the self-serving bias predicts that employ-
ees will resist absorbing information that challenges their belief that
they can only be fired for cause. 205 Kim's data support this prediction.
Even subjects that had ample access to such information-union
members, employees who had previously been responsible for hiring
and firing other employees, and of course, employees who had been
fired themselves-mispredicted the law.
20 6
Kim's data suggest that many if not most employees systematically
overestimate their legal rights. It seems reasonable to infer, based on
this overestimate, that workers make either (or both) of two miscalcu-
203 For other potential contributing factors, see Estlund, supra note 26, at 14-15
(arguing that when employers adopt internal dispute resolution procedures, employ-
ees sensibly infer that their employer needs to have some defensible reason to termi-
nate employees).
204 See Kim, supra note 2, at 482.
205 A long line of psychological research has confirmed this pattern, which is
sometimes discussed under the label cognitive dissonance and sometimes discussed as
a tendency to confirm one's prior schemas. See, e.g., Wayne Eastman, Overestimating
Oneself and Overlooking the Law: Psychological Supports for Employment at Will, 10 EMP.
RESP. & RTs.J. 21, 30 (1997) (finding that MBA students who thought at-will employ-
ment was a bad policy were less likely to believe that it was the current default rule);
Robinson, supra note 74, at 576 ("A long history of research on cognitive consistency
and attitude change has found that people act in ways that preserve their established
knowledge structures, perceptions, schemata, and memories."); Mark V. Roehling &
Wendy R. Boswell, "Good Cause Beliefs" in an "At-Will World"? A Focused Investigation of
Psychological Versus Legal Contracts, 16 EMP. REsp. & RTs. J. 211, 215 (2004) ("[T]he
good cause norm contributes to a widely shared preemployment schema . . . that
filters employer policies and shapes the employment experience to create a belief that
employers are obligated to have a good reason to discharge an employee-formal
policies not withstanding." (citation omitted)). Kim has also noted this psychological
pattern and its potential effects on employee learning. Kim supra note 2, at 496
("[O]nce formed, beliefs are likely to persist because individuals tend to notice evi-
dence that confirms their beliefs, while overlooking contradictory information.").
206 See Kim, supra note 2, at 452.
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lations, each of which could cause them to underinsure against the
risks of job loss. First, workers might believe that their probability of
being fired is lower than it actually is. Second, workers might believe
that they have a legal remedy if they are fired, and therefore believe
that they already have a form of arbitraryjob loss insurance. However,
there are data that cut against at least the first of these inferences
from Kim's study.
Contrary to what one might expect based on Kim's data, workers
appear to have a roughly accurate sense of their chances of being
fired. Several national surveys ask workers to estimate their likelihood
of being fired. Many of these surveys ask workers to use vague
probability terms-"fairly likely," "very likely," etc.-to discuss their
chances of being fired. 20 7 But it is not clear whether these terms can
be sensibly translated into more specific probabilities so that they can
be compared to actuarial job loss data.208 To date, only one major
survey has asked people to use percentages to estimate their
probability of losing a job within the next year: the Survey of Eco-
nomic Expectations (SEE).209 This would allow for an easy compari-
son to actuarial job loss data. Unfortunately, the researchers did not
follow up to assess the accuracy of job loss predictions. 210 They did,
however, interview a new cohort of people one year later and asked
them about their own job loss history.21' As long as both samples were
representative of the same underlying population, the aggregate pre-
dictions of the first sample can be compared with the aggregate out-
comes in the second sample. 212 This analysis revealed that aggregate
207 The venerable General Social Survey asked several nationally representative
samples of workers whether they were "very likely," "fairly likely," "not too likely," or
"not likely at all" to be fired or laid off in the next twelve months. See Stefanie R.
Schmidt, Long-Run Trends in Workers' Beliefs About Their Own Job Security: Evidence from
the General Social Survey, 17 J. LAB. ECON. S127, S128-29 (1999). The Health and
Retirement study uses similar probability terms. See, e.g., INST. FOR Soc. REs., UNV. OF
MIcHiGAN, 2000 HEALTH AND RETIREMENT STUDY § H, at 539, 543 (2002), available at
http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/meta/2000/core/qnaire/online/15hrOOh.pdf.
208 See Thomas S. Wallsten et al., Measuring the Vague Meanings of Probability Terms,
115 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 348, 360, 363 (1986) (finding that individuals
vary widely in their interpretation of words that describe frequencies, and noting that
the same words are interpreted differently in different contexts).
209 Charles F. Manski &John D. Straub, Worker Perceptions ofJob Insecurity in the Mid-
1990s: Evidence from the Survey of Economic Expectations, 35 J. HuM. RESOURCES 447,
449-50 (2000).
210 SeeJeff Dominitz & Charles F. Manski, Perceptions of Economic Insecurity: Evidence
from the Survey of Economic Expectations, 61 PUB. OPINION Q. 261, 281 (1997).
211 Id.
212 See id. at 281-82.
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predictions were roughly accurate. 213 Overall, men predicted a fif-
teen percent job loss rate and experienced an eighteen percent job
loss rate, while women predicted a twenty-one percent job loss rate
and experienced an eighteen percent job loss rate.21 4 Neither of
these differences were statistically significant.
Similar evidence of aggregate rationality can be seen in the
changes in worker perceptions of the probability of job loss. When
unemployment is high, more workers perceive that they are at risk of
being laid off.215 Workers are also sensitive to the rate of lay-offs
within their particular field and demographic.21 6 This does not neces-
sarily mean that workers are making accurate predictions. Consistent
with this data, workers might still systematically underestimate their
likelihood of being fired. However, combined with the SEE data, it
appears that workers have roughly accurate perceptions about their
chances of being fired, and that these perceptions respond in sensible
ways to changes in the unemployment rate.
These data-and especially the SEE data-put significant pres-
sure on the first plausible inference from Kim's study: that workers
underestimate their likelihood of being fired. In order for the aggre-
gate population of workers to be roughly accurate (consistent with the
SEE data) and for many workers to underestimate their likelihood of
being fired (consistent with Kim's data) there must be a small number
of extraordinarily pessimistic workers. The pessimism of this minority,
if severe enough, could counterbalance the optimism of the majority
and yield an overall population whose mean predictions were roughly
accurate. This could be the case. The main limitation of the SEE, like
the limitation of many behavioral economic studies discussed ear-
lier,217 is that it may mask underlying heterogeneity. For example,
this data is consistent with a population in which one eighth of people
accurately predict their probability of being fired, while three-fourths
are optimistic and another one eighth are severely pessimistic. How-
ever, the cleanest way to reconcile these competing data is to con-
clude that workers are roughly accurate in their projections of the
probability ofjob loss, and to reject the first plausible inference based
on Kim's data.218
213 Id. at 282.
214 Id.
215 Schmidt, supra note 207, at S130-31.
216 See id. at S136-39.
217 See supra Part II.A.1.
218 Even if many or most workers underestimated their probability of being fired,
it is unclear whether any disclosure strategy could debias these beliefs. The
probability of being fired, like the probability of getting a divorce, is likely to be sub-
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Although there are reasons to question the first plausible infer-
ence from Kim's data, there are no countervailing reasons to question
the second inference: that workers believe that they are entitled to a
legal remedy if they are fired for a host of reasons.219 Therefore, it
seems reasonable to proceed under the relatively conservative conclu-
sion that at least a substantial subset of employees inadequately insure
against the possibility ofjob loss because of their erroneous belief that
the law will provide them a safety net in the event that they are termi-
nated arbitrarily. The remainder of this Part proceeds under this
assumption.
2. Is Debiasing Possible?
Although sticky, employee misperceptions are probably correcta-
ble. In both marriage and employment, many people believe that a
safety net exists to protect them if an unlikely negative event occurs-
divorce and unemployment, respectively. Although people believe
that some form of safety net exists in both cases, the sources of these
beliefs are subtly different, and this has consequences for how sticky
they are. In the divorce context, an accurate view of the law creates
ambiguity in that some people receive alimony but others do not.
The probabilistic nature of the law makes people susceptible to the
above-average effect; spouses think that they will be protected even if
most others are not. In contrast, an accurate view of the at-will doc-
trine leaves no doubt about whether most kinds of terminations are
ject to a strong above-average effect. In one pertinent study, eighty-eight percent of
students exhibited some above-average effect when predicting whether they would
ever be fired from a job. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 810 tbl.1 (reporting that
optimistic responses outnumbered pessimistic reponses 7.56 to 1). On average, stu-
dents felt that they were thirty percent less likely to be fired than their peers. See id.
In a study of two engineering firms, approximately forty percent of engineers believed
that they were in the top five percent of their respective companies. Todd R. Zenger,
Why Do Employers Only Reward Extreme Performance? Examining the Relationships Among
Performance, Pay, and Turnover, 37 ADMIN. SCi. Q. 198, 202 (1992). If these engineers
believed that their likelihood of being fired was correlated with their performance,
then they probably believed that they were significantly less likely than their co-work-
ers to be fired. Workers who believe that they are less likely to be fired than their
peers are less likely to respond to disclosures about their technical lack ofjob security.
In short, correcting beliefs of at-will employees in this context would simply bring
another bias to the forefront; one that is much less susceptible to debiasing efforts.
219 Of course, if workers do not believe that they have the fight to a remedy for
being terminated arbitrarily, or if they believe that they cannot obtain a remedy for
some practical reason, then they would not believe that the law provides them with
any form of safety net. These workers will not be lead to underinsure based on their
beliefs about at-will employment, and therefore even if these beliefs are factually
incorrect, they would not create costs. Debiasing would therefore be unnecessary.
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legal. In short, the factual beliefs of at-will employees are currently
verifiable in a way that the predictions of engaged couples are not.
A short, simple, and roughly accurate disclosure could probably
debias a substantial number of workers.220 In Kim's study, the one
piece of available information-that the company "reserves the right
to discharge employees at any time, for any reason, with or without
cause" 221-was ambiguous in that it did not explicitly say anything
about the state of the law. To be sure, it strongly implied that at-will
employment was legal. But seventy-five percent of people who initially
thought that for cause employment was the default rule rejected this
implication and concluded that the company-which was perhaps not
a reliable source-was not accurately communicating the current state
of the law.2 22 This allowed the workers in Kim's study to fill the gaps
in their knowledge with self-serving assumptions.
Government warnings are likely to be particularly effective
debiasing mechanisms in the employment context. The perceived
source of a warning is very important to its perceived reliability. 223
Not surprisingly, warnings are less effective when people think that
they come from sources that have a stake in the outcome, or when
they come from unknown sources.224 In some instances, the govern-
ment is particularly credible. 225 This is likely to be the case in the
employment context. If there is one type of information the govern-
ment should know, it is the current content of domestic law. Conse-
quently, it is probable that workers are much less likely to ignore
government disclosures that directly comment on the legality of at-will
220 Michael S. Wogalter et al., On the Adequacy of Legal Documents: Factors That Influ-
ence Informed Consent, 42 ERGONOMICS 593, 595, 604 (1999) (discussing existing studies
and conducting research showing that short and simple consent forms communicate
more information than longer, more detailed forms).
221 Kim, supra note 2, at 465.
222 See id. (reporting that three-quarters of respondents who believed the law for-
bade cost-saving discharges continued this belief despite the explicit disclosure).
223 Elizabeth J. Wilson & Daniel L. Sherrell, Source Effects in Communication and
Persuasion Research: A Meta-Analysis of Effect Size, 21 J. AGAD. MARKETING SCI. 101 (1993)
(finding source effects in meta-analysis of 114 studies).
224 Cox & Wogalter, supra note 28, at 119 (finding that people make common-
sense credibility judgments when assessing sources such as the American Medical
Association, the U.S. Surgeon General, and unlabeled warnings).
225 C. Samuel Craig & John M. McCann, Assessing Communication Effects on Energy
Conservation, 5 J. CONSUMER RES. 82, 86 (1978) (finding that consumers reduced
energy more when the request was attributed to a government agent rather than the
electric company); Michael S. Wogalter et al., Effect of Signal Word and Source Attribution
on Judgments of Warning Credibility and Compliance Likelihood, 24 INT'L J. INDUS. ERGO-
NOMICS 185, 190-92 (1999) (finding that the mere addition of the words "Govern-
ment Warning" increases the perceived credibility of nutrition and health labels).
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employment than statements by a self-interested company that it
reserves the right to fire employees for any reason.
Warnings are no panacea, but they need not be to be useful. No
disclosure will be totally free from ambiguity, so no disclosure will
completely eliminate the effects of the self-serving bias. Language
barriers, inattention, anti-warnings, and information overload all
reduce the effectiveness of static warning labels.226 Yet even these sim-
ple warnings produce useful effects. In the largest meta-analysis to
date, Eli Cox found that simple static warnings about the risk of physi-
cal injury increased compliance with safety precautions by eleven to
twenty percent.227 These studies involved the risk of being injured
through the use of a wide variety of consumer products. 228 Individu-
als are likely to exhibit strong above-average effects when they think
about their own chance of being injured by these products, in part
because they are likely to have a false sense of control. 229 Therefore,
warnings in the employment context might have better results. Even
if a simple warning could only debias twenty percent of the United
States' at-will employees, 230 it could greatly reduce the information
asymmetry in a vast majority of employment contracts and reduce the
likelihood that these workers will underinsure against the risks of job
loss.
3. Collateral Costs of Debiasing
As with any debiasing strategy, there is a risk of introducing new
biases into the population. Telling workers that they can be fired
without recourse for any arbitrary reason is likely to have two effects.
First, workers are likely to realize that employment law does not pro-
vide them with a safety net in the event of mostjob terminations. This
is the main debiasing effect discussed above. Second, this type of dis-
closure is likely to make workers more pessimistic about the likelihood
that they could be fired. If, as the SEE data suggests, workers are
226 See generally Latin, supra note 24, at 1206-55 (discussing the various reasons for
the ineffectiveness of warning labels).
227 See Cox et al., supra note 24, at 199.
228 Id. at 197 tbl.1.
229 See Dunning et al., supra note 31, at 80.
230 SeeJack Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment-at-Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557, 558
(1985) (estimating that there are sixty million at-will employees in the United States);
see also Richard J. Pratt, Comment, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks:
Further Encroachments on the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 197, 197
(1990) ("[E]ighty-five percent of the present American work force-approximately
eighty-three million people-are employed under the at-will doctrine.").
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roughly accurate in their current predictions, then making them
more pessimistic will create a potentially costly bias.
There are two reasons to believe that inducing pessimism is less
costly than declining to correct optimism in the employment context,
and that therefore it may be worthwhile to trade the later error for the
former. First and foremost, the market is better at correcting pessi-
mism than it is at correcting optimism. Second, overinsuring (the
main cost associated with pessimism) may be preferable to underin-
suring, all else being equal.
As discussed above, employers do not have an incentive to correct
the beliefs of optimistic workers. 23' Employers do, however, have an
incentive to combat pessimism and make their workers feel secure in
theirjobs so that they are more willing to invest in job-specific skills. 232
The self-correcting nature of job-related pessimism provides policy-
makers with a cushion that reduces the ill effects of regulation that
moves workers toward the pessimism side of the optimism-pessimism
spectrum.
The costs of any remaining pessimism are likely to be much
smaller than the corresponding collateral costs in the marriage con-
text. There are plausibly similar stories that one could tell about opti-
mism in both contexts. Recall that in romantic relationships, general
optimism improved the quality and duration of relationships. 233 Rela-
tionship-specific optimism was likely to have an even stronger effect.
Similarly, job-related optimism almost certainly affects job satisfaction,
job performance, and the overall duration of an employment relation-
ship.234 Just as optimistic people perceive that their romantic partner
is more supportive, optimistic employees are likely to see their
employer as more supportive. 23 5  Employees that perceive their
employer as faithful and supportive are more likely to feel secure,
invest in job-specific skills, and perform better overall. 23 6 This sug-
gests that the costs of pessimism might be high (and ironic): debiasing
231 See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
232 Employers may also have an incentive to make false promises of job security.
The disclosure strategy advocated here would not, therefore, cut against courts get-
ting involved in enforcing oral promises.
233 See supra Part III.A.3.
234 See, e.g., Thomas M. Begley et al., The Relationships of Type A Behavior and Opti-
mism with Job Performance and Blood Pressure, 15J. Bus. & PSYCHOL. 215, 223-25 (2000).
235 See Richard G. Best et al., Core Self-Evaluations and Job Burnout: The Test of Alter-
native Models, 10 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 441, 450-51 (2005) (finding a
correlation between self-esteem, self-efficacy, and perceived employer support among
health care workers).
236 See Kim, supra note 2, at 482.
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workers may cause them to be fired more often. Nonetheless, any
adverse effects of decreased optimism will be self-correcting.
Overly pessimistic workers will have the option to purchase job
security. To the extent that workers (over)value job security, they can
decide how much they are willing to pay for it, and attempt to buy it
from their employer. Although few workers have the luxury to negoti-
ate customized employment contracts, employers will have an incen-
tive to selljob security rights in their standard contract. There are two
main sources for these employer incentives. First, if employee per-
formance decreases as a result of decreased job-related optimism-
and there is evidence suggesting that it wil1237-employers will have an
incentive to improve performance by reinvigorating employee opti-
mism. Second, employers whose workers are somewhat mobile will
have an incentive to sell job security in order to prevent workers from
bargaining with their feet by joining a company that already provides
it. It is not entirely clear how many companies currently offer for-
cause protections. The best estimate available indicates that approxi-
mately fifteen percent of U.S. firms voluntarily offer for-cause protec-
tions.238 If the demand for such protections grew, it is likely that
more firms would offer them. This in turn would further increase
employer incentives to offer job security by increasing the options
available to employees.
If workers choose to purchase job security, then they can remain
optimistic about the duration of their work relationship. This distin-
guishes the employment context from that of marriage. Our cultural
norms accept explicit bargaining in employment relationships much
more readily than in romantic relationships; the process of bargaining
about the end of an employment relationship is unlikely to perma-
nently scar optimism. Further, the legal constraints on marital con-
tracts prevent them from fully repairing optimism. In many states,
couples cannot contract into a fault regime-by, for example, waiving
their right to seek a divorce absent adultery or other breach of the
marital agreement.239 Therefore, marital contracts have only a lim-
ited ability to prevent a divorce from occurring, and entering a mari-
tal contract cannot fully restore one's optimism that the relationship
237 See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
238 J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Termn Employment Con-
tracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 837, 867.
239 See, e.g., Diosdado v. Diosdado, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 496-97 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (refusing to enforce a prenuptial agreement providing for a $50,000 adultery
penalty because "the agreement attempts to impose a penalty on one of the parties as
a result of that party's 'fault' during the marriage, [and therefore] it is contrary to the
public policy underlying the no-fault provisions for dissolution of marriage").
[VOL. 84:2
STICKY EXPECTATIONS
will endure. Employment contracts do not suffer from this limitation.
Companies can commit to restrictions on the termination of the
employment relationship. This provides a degree of security that is
absent from marital contracts, and improves the likelihood that the
contract can restore relationship-specific optimism. Even if workers
cannot successfully bargain for job -security, they can (over)insure
against the risk ofjob-loss in other ways, such as investing in skills that
are transferable rather than company-specific, or increasing their sav-
ing rate.
Because the costs of pessimism are limited by the price of
purchasing job security, pessimism may be preferable to optimism.
Put another way, overinsuring may be preferable to underinsuring.
240
While overinsuring saps money from workers that they could use for
other goods, these costs are small for each individual. Underinsuring,
by contrast, leads to small savings for most, but large losses for the few
workers who are fired and who have not prepared for it. Even if these
two outcomes were equivalent in terms of their aggregate costs, policy-
makers could sensibly prefer the system that tends to spread the costs
of job losses over a larger number of workers.241 As Alan Schwartz
and Louis L. Wilde concluded in a similar context, "Consumers seem-
ingly are worse off if they are without protection... than if they some-
times have too much protection.
'" 242
4. Alternate Proposals
An understanding of sticky expectations provides insights into
other proposals for dealing with employee misperceptions. Cass Sun-
stein and Cynthia Estlund have recommended that policymakers
adopt a "for cause" default rule instead of the existing at-will
default.243 This default should be "strong" in that waiving it would
require a "knowing and voluntary" act.244 The exact nature of this
heightened standard is unclear. But both scholars note that the Age
240 Cf Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1427-30
(1983) (analyzing the effects of optimism and pessimism on consumer demands for
product warranties and concluding that markets are well suited to correct for pessi-
mism but cannot adequately address optimism).
241 Cf Jules Coleman, The Costs of The Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REv. 337, 346,
352 (2005) (arguing that, at a minimum, the questions of reducing costs and distrib-
uting costs are separate, and ultimately concluding that the goal of reducing aggre-
gate cost is secondary to issues of justice and distribution).
242 Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 240, at 1427-28.
243 Estlund, supra note 26, at 23-24; Sunstein, supra note 26, at 244-45.
244 Estlund, supra note 26, at 23-24; Sunstein, supra note 26, at 244.
20091
778 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:2
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967245 might provide
a useful starting point.246 The ADEA allows employees to waive their
protections from past age-related discrimination if their waiver is
knowing and voluntary.247 An agreement waiving ADEA protections is
"knowing and voluntary" if it specifically refers to the fights created by
the statute, advises the employee to seek the advice of counsel, and
provides cooling-off periods.
24 8
It is not clear what benefits the ADEA procedures would bring to
at-will employees. Under these procedures, employers would be
required to inform employees of the for-cause default rule, and to
inform them when they are waiving its protections. This is a good
start, but is missing a key piece of information. This requirement only
ensures that workers understand the set of rights that they are waiving.
But it is much more important for workers to understand what rights
(if any) they are retaining. There are a range of protections that a
company could provide that would fall somewhere between the rules
of at-will employment and for-cause protections. Simply noting that
an employment relationship is not governed by the for-cause standard
creates ambiguity, which in turn invites the self-serving bias. Workers
may waive for-cause protections and yet believe that they have some
residual rights.
The other requirements under the ADEA do not appear to be
aimed at information-forcing or debiasing. There is little reason to
believe that people will become less prone to self-serving biases over
the course of a cooling-off period, or that they will be motivated to
seek out legal information during this time. It is also unclear whether
a warning to seek counsel would help. If an explicit statement that
the company "reserves the right to discharge employees at any time,
for any reason, with or without cause" does not motivate most employ-
ees to question their preexisting beliefs about their legal protec-
tions, 249 then providing advice to seek an attorney is likely to do little
or nothing. Overall, the ADEA standard is unlikely to facilitate the
type of information transfer that is required to inform workers both of
their rights, and of the effects of waiving these rights.
Using information-forcing default rules in this context suffers
from all the weaknesses of these rules without capitalizing on their
unique strength. Information-forcing default rules are particularly
245 Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 621-634 (West 1999 & Supp. 2008)).
246 Estlund, supra note 26, at 24; Sunstein, supra note 26, at 244.
247 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2006).
248 Id.
249 Kim, supra note 2, at 465.
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useful when one party to a transaction has private information-infor-
mation that is unknown to the other party and to relevant regulatory
bodies.250 In these cases, penalty default rules are a powerful way to
elicit that information.251 In the context of at-will employment, infor-
mation-forcing rules give the employer an incentive to inform the
employee about the nature of her legal rights. But this is not private
information. Policymakers already know the legal definition of at-will
employment. They can skip the middle man and design the relevant
disclosure themselves rather than requiring the employer to develop
the content of a disclosure subject to judicial oversight. Such an
administrative approach would have several benefits. It would mini-
mize transaction costs by eliminating the need to litigate the effective-
ness of many subtly different disclosure statements. 252 It would also
provide a method for centralized public input about the content of
the disclosure. If there were any question of a disclosure's effective-
ness, an agency would always have the option of conducting indepen-
dent studies. To be sure, charging an agency with this responsibility is
not free from problems. Agency capture would be the most pressing
concern.253 A full exposition of these concerns is beyond the scope of
this Article. However, an agency's ability to design and test warnings
ex ante provides strong reason to suspect that, if policymakers chose
to explore the benefits of warnings further, an administrative solution
is best.
250 Cf John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An
Essay on theJudicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1623 (1989) ("The rationale for.., a
'coercive' default rule is that it forces those possessing private information to disclose
it to the market .... ").
251 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertmer, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 95-100 (1989) (evaluating penalty default rules
as "a way to encourage the production of information").
252 For an example of how unpredictable ex post enforcement waivers can be, see
McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 990-91 (Wyo. 1991) (holding
that an express at-will disclaimer that followed the words "READ CAREFULLY
BEFORE SIGNING" was not sufficiently clear because it was not set off by a border, in
large print, or in the beginning of the handbook).
253 See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. Riv. 1039, 1050 (1997) (defining agency capture as the phenomenon where agen-
cies "become 'captured' by the business organizations that they are charged with
regulating").
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C. Credit Card Usage
1. Evidence of Sticky Expectations
Credit cards are extraordinarily useful. Americans currently owe
.almost one trillion dollars in credit card debt.254 Much but not all of
this debt is benign. For those who do not keep a revolving balance,
credit cards provide a fast, convenient, and free alternative to cash
and checks. Consumers who do carry a balance still benefit from fast
stigma-free loans. These loans help families cope with emergencies 255
and help entrepreneurs cope with the growing pains of start-up
businesses.
256
There are also potential downsides to credit card borrowing.
Credit cards allow consumers to obtain the benefits of a purchase and
delay its pains. This leads people to spend more when they make
purchases with credit cards as opposed to cash. 257 Even the mere
presence of a MasterCard logo induced subjects in one study to say
that they would spend more for a given product.258 Of course, spend-
ing more is not necessarily a bad thing. Consumer spending is a hall-
mark of a healthy and confident economy. But increased credit card
spending often leads to increased credit card debt, which can carry
several negative consequences.
Most people who accrue credit card debt are not happy about
it.259 In short, many people regret their choices to incur debt.260 This
254 Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Consumer Credit (July 8, 2008), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/RELEASES/gl9/20080708 (revolving credit, non-seasonally
adjusted).
255 Littwin, supra note 33, at 459.
256 MANN, supra note 34, at 41.
257 See id. 45-56; Richard A. Feinberg, Credit Cards as Spending Facilitating Stimuli: A
Conditioning Interpretation, 13 J. CONSUMER REs. 348, 355 (1986) (reviewing nearly a
dozen studies showing a correlation between using credit cards and spending more);
Littwin, supra note 33, at 467 (conducting interviews with low-income women and
finding that two-thirds of them reported that credit cards created temptation to spend
more than they should).
258 See Feinberg, supra note 257, at 350, 352-54.
259 See George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, "We Can Do This the Easy Way or
the Hard Way": Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI L. REV. 183, 197
(2005) (noting that people think that paying credit card debt is less pleasant than
paying a parking ticket).
260 The women in Angela Littwin's study said it well: one woman said, "I charge,
and I charged because I needed-you know, you go, 'Oh, I need clothing. Oh, I need
a birthday present.' And I've been 'needing.' As you can see, I 'needed' too much."
Littwin, supra note 33, at 469. Another explained, "When I originally took out that
card, I didn't know how quickly the amount could skyrocket, till you owe them an arm
and a leg." Id. at 480.
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regret signifies that the initial choice to incur debt may not have been
welfare enhancing, and may result in both monetary and emotional
costs.
There are at least two plausible explanations for why consumers
might accrue more debt than they intend to. First, they may accu-
rately predict their future borrowing and payment patterns, but mis-
understand how quickly their debt will grow. Second, people may
mispredict their future borrowing and payment patterns due to an
above-average effect.
These explanations lead to different policy prescriptions. Under
the first story, overly optimistic expectations are not necessarily sticky.
If they learn about how interest is calculated, or if they are provided
with the results of these calculations, their predictions of the cost of
borrowing should change. Under the second story, consumers have
sticky expectations that may not be amenable to debiasing through
disclosure. However, the cost of these sticky expectations is debatable.
Unlike in the marriage and employment context, credit card consum-
ers have many opportunities to learn from their mistakes. Every
month they decide how much to borrow and get feedback about how
much debt their borrowing produces. This constant feedback may
itself debias consumers. Ultimately, policymakers should focus on
reducing the costs of this learning process and on giving knowledgea-
ble consumers the tools they need to manage their own use of credit.
But there will assuredly be a group of consumers whom policymakers
cannot debias in a cost-effective manner. Just as a cost-sensitive gov-
ernment might not attempt to prevent all accidents, it might not
attempt to save every consumer from their overly optimistic
borrowing.
The first story explaining why consumers may borrow more than
they intend-that consumers may accurately predict their future bor-
rowing and payment patterns, but misunderstand how quickly their
owed interest will grow-does not immediately suggest the existence
of sticky expectations. Like the errors in the employment context,
these erroneous expectations are, at root, a mistake about a currently
verifiable fact. Correcting this error has been the focus of most regu-
lation to date. For example, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005261 amends the Truth in
Lending Act 262 to require a host of disclosures that are aimed at pro-
261 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
11, 12, 18, 28 U.S.C.).
262 Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1677 (2006)).
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viding consumers with relevant information about the costs of borrow-
ing.263 In an effort to make information clear and comparable, it
requires late fees and finance charges to be translated into an annual
percentage rate terms.2 64 In some cases it also requires a simple state-
ment about minimum payments:
Minimum Payment Warning: Making only the minimum payment
will increase the interest you pay and the time it takes to repay
your balance. For example, making only the typical 2% minimum
monthly payment on a balance of $1,000 at an interest rate of 17%
would take 88 months to repay the balance in full. For an estimate
of the time it would take to repay your balance, making only mini-
mum payments, call this toll-free number: _ 265
In a recent laboratory study, similar disclosures did not improve
consumers' knowledge about interest rates, minimum payments, or
other relevant concepts.2 6 6 Nor did more detailed disclosures. 267 Fur-
ther, these disclosures did not have any effect on subjects' subsequent
decisions to make purchases with their credit cards. This suggests that
most people either did not read, or did not understand, these warn-
ings. This study was repeated with a group of consumers that had
filed for bankruptcy-a group that Congress was particularly inter-
ested in helping when it designed these warnings. 268 The more
detailed warnings had some effect on this group of debtors. Those
debtor-consumers presented with the detailed warnings were less
likely to use their credit cards.269 But again, the warnings did not
improve their knowledge of key concepts. 2 70 This raises the intriguing
possibility that these warnings are doing no more than a "Caution"
sign would. They are communicating that there is some degree of
danger involved with credit cards, but they are not successful at com-
municating anything more specific that would allow consumers to
choose between cards or make more nuanced decisions. This inter-
pretation has further empirical support from the same study. After
263 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b) (2006).
264 Id. This warning is quite similar to one that California attempted to require in
2002. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.13 (West Supp. 2008), invalidated by Am. Bankers
Ass'n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that the state statute
unconstitutionally interfered with multiple federal laws).
265 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b)(11)(A) (2006).
266 See Richard Wiener et al., Consumer Credit Card Use: The Roles of Creditor Disclo-
sure and Anticipated Emotion, 13J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 32, 44 (2007).
267 Id.
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being presented with the warnings, debtor-consumers become sensi-
tive to the number of times that they used their card, but not to the
total amount of money that they charged on it.2 7 1 This suggests that
consumers understand that using credit cards might be dangerous,
but do not understand that this danger is a function of how much
they charge. It may simply be too difficult to teach the math necessary
to compute interest in a single disclosure. This suggests that objective
factual errors, in addition to mispredictions about uncertain future
events, can sometimes be sticky.
The second story-that people may mispredict their future bor-
rowing and payment patterns-strongly suggests the existence of
sticky expectations. Consumers may mispredict their future borrow-
ing and payment patterns due to an above-average effect.27 2 If the
above-average effect is the primary cause of over-borrowing, then the
problems of optimism in marriage and divorce are directly parallel to
the problems of optimism in the credit card setting. In both cases
people suffer adverse financial consequences because they underesti-
mate the likelihood of a future event (divorce and future borrowing,
respectively) and fail to take adequate precautionary measures (main-
tainingjob skills and rejecting credit card solicitations, respectively).
It is likely that each story accurately describes as least a subset of
the consumer population. Given the number of situations where peo-
ple exhibit above-average effects and the prevalence of those above-
average effects, it is likely that a substantial proportion of consumers
exhibit unrealistic optimism in this context. This conclusion is bol-
stered by the link between perceived control and over-optimism.
273
Credit card consumers have substantial control over how often they
use their credit cards and how much they repay each month. This
nominal control fosters overconfidence and probably leads at least a
subset of credit card consumers to accrue more debt than they origi-
nally intended.
The costs that stem from sticky expectations in the credit card
context depend in large part on whether and when consumers learn
271 Id. at 38-39.
272 For additional costs of over-optimism in this context, see Sha Yang et al.,
Unrealistic Optimism in Consumer Credit Card Adoption, 28J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 170, 178-79
(2007) (analyzing two measures of optimism and finding that, under each measure,
overly optimistic people are less likely to consider interest rates when they obtain a
credit card).
273 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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from their mistakes. 274 At one extreme is a consumer who makes a
relatively small mistake and thereafter uses credit cards in a more
measured way, comparing the costs of her various sources of credit
before borrowing. At the other is a consumer who makes a series of
mistakes or one large mistake and ends up in bankruptcy. These con-
sumers impose costs not only on themselves, but also all of their
potential creditors and the legal system.
Even if all consumers learn, there is still a potential place for reg-
ulation. Learning is sometimes a costly process. In one in-depth study
of credit usage in a public housing project, only seven out of fifty low-
income women were aware of the temptation that credit cards might
create before they obtained one. 275 The remainder learned the hard
way. Many borrowed more than they intended to, and only then, after
getting in over their heads, realized how easily they could slip into
debt. 276 Depending on the amount of debt they accrue, consumers
may pay a high price to learn their lesson. A state concerned with
aggregate welfare has an interest in reducing the costs of these les-
sons, at least if it can do so without substantially reducing the lesson's
effectiveness.
2 7 7
Even those consumers who learn about the dangers of easy credit
before they experience it themselves may incur and impose costs.
Currently, credit cards are not designed to help consumers limit their
274 For further comments about the dangers of assuming static models of human
behavior that do not account for the possibility of learning, see Mitchell, supra note
121, at 165.
275 See Littwin, supra note 33, at 469-70.
276 See id.
277 Jonathan Klick and Gregory Mitchell have recently argued that any govern-
ment intervention that reduces the cost of an error will also substantially reduce indi-
vidual incentives to learn. Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation
of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1633 (2006). This
assumes a linear or near-linear relationship between incentives and motivation: the
greater the incentive, the more motivated an individual will be to make the proper
choice. Experimental economics has shown, however, that there is not a linear rela-
tionship between potential losses and cognitive effort; small incentives and large
incentives often produce similar results. See Mitchell, supra note 121, at 114-16.
There are also intuitive reasons to believe that one's cognitive efforts may max out at
some point, making further increases in the costs of an error irrelevant to cognitive
effort. This intuition is borne out in the field. Insurance companies create incentives
for drivers to be careful by charging a deductible, even though this deductible can be
quite small compared to the cost of an accident. Similarly, our entire educational
system is built on the assumption that small incentives (grades) can be sufficiently
motivating. This suggests that the government could substantially reduce the costs of
error without appreciably affecting the likelihood that individuals will learn from
their mistakes.
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borrowing.278 Therefore, even if a consumer is aware of her tendency
to overborrow, she might be able to do very little about it. To be sure,
these consumers could throw away all of their credit cards and only
use debit cards. But this may not be a realistic solution when people
need access to some easy credit, and merely want to limit the amount
of credit that they have access to.
279
The largest single indicator that people are accruing more debt
than they intend, and that this debt creates costs, is the link between
credit card debt and bankruptcy. It is widely acknowledged that there
is a correlation between credit card debt and bankruptcy. 280 The
exact contours of that correlation are a bit less clear, but the best data
suggest that increases in credit card debt lead to increased bankrupt-
cies one to three years later.28 ' "Even if credit card spending and con-
sumer debt are held constant, an increase in credit card debt-a shift
of consumer borrowing from noncard borrowing to card borrowing-
is associated with an increase in bankruptcy filings." 282 This suggests
that there is something about credit card debt that makes it more
prone to lead to bankruptcy than other forms of consumer debt. That
extra "something" might well be the tendency of consumers to spend
more than they intend when using credit cards, and to thereby accrue
more debt than they intend. This tendency, once combined with con-
sumers' poor understanding of interest charges28 3 and the rights of
278 See Littwin, supra note 33, at 478.
279 Angela Littwin has recently proposed a series of "self-directed" credit card
reforms aimed at allowing people to pre-commit to spending limits, opt-out of credit
card solicitations, and design cards that reduce their tendency to overborrow. See id.
at 478-96. These reforms are aimed at a group of consumers that Littwin deems
"sophisticated" because they are aware that they may borrow more than they intend.
Id. at 467. This Article focuses on the second major group of consumers that Littwin
identifies-"naive" consumers who do not think that they will overborrow and later
regret their initial choices-and explores how policymakers might help naive con-
sumers become more sophisticated.
280 See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 72 (2000);
Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality,
Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1481,
1521-24 (2006); ToddJ. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis,
99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1463, 1496 (2005); RonaldJ. Mann, Credit Cards, Consumer Credit &
Bankruptcy 30 (Univ. of Texas Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.
44, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=690701.
281 See Mann, supra note 280, at 27 tbl.9 (repeating an analysis done in MANN,
supra note 34, at 71, to account for and correct a weakness in his statistical methodol-
ogy, and largely finding that his original results remained unchanged).
282 Id. at 30.
283 Wiener et al., supra note 266, at 33.
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credit card companies to retroactively increase rates, 28 4 helps explain
why credit card debt is more likely to lead to bankruptcy than other
forms of debt.
28 5
2. Is Debiasing Possible?
The costs of credit card debt, while potentially severe, do not
affect the vast majority of credit card consumers. Most individuals do
not make costly mistakes when using credit cards. Only half of credit
card users carry any balance on their credit cards. 286 Among them,
few get into deep trouble. Half of all households with credit card debt
would only need to dedicate four percent of their annual income for
one year to pay off that debt.287 Only about one percent of house-
holds would have to dedicate eighty percent or more of their annual
income in order to pay off their credit card debt.
28 8
Because the highest costs associated with credit card debt are
concentrated in a small (at least relatively speaking) subpopulation,
policymakers must be careful when responding to these costs. Ban-
ning certain credit card terms,289 or banning credit cards outright,
290
284 Littwin, supra note 33, at 58 (quoting low-income women who did not know
that their interest rates could go up because of universal default rules); Ronald J.
Mann, "Contracting"for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899, 923 (2006) (describing "univer-
sal default provisions" under which credit card companies can raise interest rates on
existing debt in response to late payments on other credit cards).
285 For a discussion of why credit card debt causes bankruptcies, as opposed to the
opposite causal direction-the availability of a future bankruptcy discharge causing
increased credit card spending-see Mann, supra note 280, at 31-32 (confronting
several arguments by Todd Zywicki and arguing that it is doubtful that debtors can
predict bankruptcy three years in advance in order to start borrowing strategically);
see also TERESA SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 240-42 (2d ed. 1999)
(reporting that the variation in filing rates within states is greater than the variation
between states even though some states provide much higher incentives to oppor-
tunistically borrow and then file for bankruptcy by protecting substantially more prop-
erty from creditors); Block-Leib & Janger, supra note 280, at 1525 (arguing that
opportunistic borrowers would be very costly to credit card companies, and yet there
is little evidence that the increase in bankruptcies has had much effect on the cost to
credit card companies of extending credit); Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law and
Economics, Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 470, 492 (2007) ("The results also pose a challenge to the hypothesis that
[consumers] ramp up borrowing in anticipation of filing because the surge in bank-
ruptcies comes a year after aggregate credit card debt increases.").
286 Wiener et al., supra note 266, at 32.
287 DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC 103 (2d ed.
2005).
288 Id.
289 Mann, supra note 284, at 922-23.
290 Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 259, at 197-98.
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will affect a large number of people who benefit from being able to
take on credit card debt. Debiasing strategies may offer the best hope
of reducing the costs of credit card debt without interfering with the
majority of people who appear to use credit cards with a reasonable
amount of responsibility.
In Seduction by Plastic, Oren Bar-Gill sketched out one potential
debiasing strategy for consumer over-optimism in the credit card con-
text. He suggested providing customers with a customized prediction
of how much they will borrow in the future. 291 These data should not
be too costly to produce, because credit card companies already have
similar algorithms that help them to set rates and target certain
populations. 29
2
Existing research casts some doubt on the efficacy of this propo-
sal. Recall that, in the health context, providing individual custom-
ized risk information does not necessarily reduce optimism for any
length of time.293 But there are some intuitive reasons to think that
disclosures would be more effective in the credit card context. In
both of the health-related studies, subjects received a single risk assess-
ment. After two to six months, such interventions had inconsistent
effects.
It is plausible that interventions could achieve more consistent
results if they were repeated-and the credit card context facilitates
repetition. If every monthly credit card statement contained an esti-
mate of how much each borrower is projected to borrow (or how
much each "above-average" cardholder is projected to borrow),294 and
also included feedback showing that a consumer's actual borrowing
and repayment patterns were similar to the "average borrower," con-
sumers might learn to incorporate actuarial risk information sooner.
This would allow consumers to incur smaller costs between the time
when they begin to borrow and the time when they learn to accurately
calculate the costs of borrowing. But these are educated guesses only.
There is no direct data about whether or to what extent the frequency
of a warning influences how much they internalize it. This is a fertile
291 See Bar-Gill, supra note 30, at 1418-20. This is similar to a suggestion by Alan
Schwartz and Larry Wilde that consumers should receive information about how
many consumers end up defaulting on their credit card debt, along with an admoni-
tion that consumers should not think that they will be better than average at avoiding
default. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 240, at 1436.
292 See, e.g., Timothy C. Lambert, Fair Marketing: Challenging Pre-Application Lending
Practices, 87 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2189-93 (1999).
293 See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
294 See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
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area for future research that would contribute to the credit card
debate as well as informing various public health campaigns.
3. Collateral Costs of Debiasing
Assuming that debiasing is possible through customized and
repeated information disclosures, it is unlikely to create negative col-
lateral costs. Unlike in the marriage context, unrealistic optimism
does not create positive effects. Unrealistically optimistic people bor-
row more than they otherwise would. Although this allows them to
enjoy short-term gains, these gains normally come at a large cost.
Individuals end up paying back far more than they borrow295 and
regretting their earlier borrowing decisions. 296 Eliminating unrealis-
tic optimism is therefore likely to save money and regret.
As with any debiasing strategy, there is a risk of introducing new
biases into the target population. Although unrealistic optimism is
likely to harm borrowers, unrealistic pessimism is likely to harm them
as well. Most low-income people obtain credit cards for emergen-
cies.297 Credit cards provide access to a fast and easy loan in such
circumstances, which may be well worth its costs. Therefore, there is a
positive optimal level of borrowing. This makes some debiasing meth-
ods especially inappropriate. For example, using the availability heu-
ristic (for instance by providing a vivid account enumerating all of the
ways a particular individual was harmed by high debt) to create an
equal and opposite bias that dissuaded people from borrowing on
their credit cards would be extremely difficult. It is likely that some
people would remain overly optimistic, while others would become
overly pessimistic about the dangers of credit card debt.
Simple disclosure strategies are unlikely to create this type of
unrealistic pessimism, provided that they disclose accurate informa-
tion. If the actuarial warnings that Bar-Gill envisions are fairly accu-
rate, then credit card consumers will gain a more accurate sense of
the costs of borrowing. Similarly, informing consumers that they will
probably pay two hundred dollars in interest if they borrow five hun-
dred dollars allows them to more accurately judge whether a current
emergency calls for credit card borrowing, or whether another bor-
rowing method might be preferable. Even if someone cannot borrow
from relatives, she might rationally prefer other forms of borrowing-
295 For example, with an annual percentage rate (APR) of eighteen percent, and a
minimum payment of $20, a consumer would pay off a $500 debt in fifty-nine months,
and pay a total of $215.68 in interest.
296 See Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 259, at 197.
297 See Littwin, supra note 33, at 459.
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pawn shops, rent-to-own stores, or financed purchasing options that
are offered by some catalog retailers-to credit cards. 298
4. Alternative Proposals
What if debiasing is not possible? If consumers systematically
underestimate their borrowing and overestimate their ability to repay,
and debiasing is not a realistic option, policymakers should explore
insulation strategies that decrease the costs of these erroneous expec-
tations. Any insulation strategies, however, will have to confront the
fact that most people are not harmed by credit card debt, and the
costs of credit card debt are disproportionately borne by a small sub-
set of the population. Policymakers could take one of two approaches
to dealing with this issue. First, policymakers could attempt to identify
the subpopulation that is at risk of accruing high credit card debt, and
target an intervention only at those people. This will prove difficult.
Some observable traits correlate with credit card debt, such as age,
education, and income.2 99 However, academic researchers have not
yet been able to create accurate predictions of who will end up in
bankruptcy, let alone the more subtle inquiry into who will end up
accruing substantially more debt than they intend to. 300
Second, if policymakers cannot identify at-risk consumers ex
ante, or if they cannot create interventions that target only this sub-
population, then they should consider asymmetrically paternalistic
interventions, that is, those that impose little or no burden on most
credit card consumers. A full discussion of these insulation strategies
is outside the scope of this Article. I offer just a few preliminary
comments.
Legal scholars have proposed insulation strategies that range
from banning credit cards outright"i to merely restricting a subset of
298 See id. at 490 (reporting that low-income women rated pawn shops and
financed purchasing plans as better sources of borrowing than credit cards because
with credit cards it was too easy to accrue unmanageable debt).
299 Tom Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic, Maybe Not So Crazy, 73 U. CHI.
L. REv. 63, 80 (2006) ("[R]evolvers [consumers who do not pay their credit card bal-
ance in full each month] were younger and had lower income, less education, and
larger households than nonrevolvers. Revolvers more frequently did not own their
homes and were not married compared to nonrevolvers.").
300 F. H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
187, 196, 206 (1998) (creating a model to predict bankruptcies and ultimately con-
cluding that bankruptcy rates are most affected by local social norms). Of course, the
proprietary algorithms of credit card companies may be more successful in predicting
bankruptcies, but academics and government regulators do not have access to these
data.
301 Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 259, at 200.
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credit card advertising. 30 2 A middle option would be to standardize
credit card contract terms in order to facilitate market competition.
30 3
This could be done, as it is in the mortgage and landlord-tenant mar-
kets, by direct government regulation of the terms of the contract.
30 4
But policymakers face a difficult task here. They must be able to iden-
tify those terms that few people benefit from, and that simultaneously
create costs for others.
Ultimately, there may be only a narrow range of insulation strate-
gies that are costjustified, and policymakers may have to make do with
regulations that only partially alleviate the costs of unanticipated
credit card debt. Thus, the credit card context may illustrate the third
broad approach that policymakers might take when faced with sticky
expectations: inaction. 30 5 It may not always be worth closing the gap
between expectations and reality, at least not completely.
CONCLUSION
Irrational optimism is often resistant to change. Legal scholars
and policymakers should acknowledge this stickiness, because it has
important implications for the costs and benefits of reform proposals
in a wide variety of areas, including family law, employment law, and
credit card regulation. A Calabresian framework can help us to assess
those costs and benefits sensibly. It can help us decide whether it is
worth implementing legal reform to close the gap between expecta-
tions and reality, and if so, whether to do so by attempting to unstick
the expectations or by insulating against the costs of irrational opti-
mism in other ways. The main pattern that emerges is that debiasing
is unlikely to correct above-average effects and errors that people
make when they are predicting their likelihood of suffering some
future negative event. But debiasing is likely to be useful when people
are exhibiting self-serving biases and making errors about the content
of the law or some other currently verifiable fact.
302 For example, Bar-Gill proposes a ban on unsolicited offers that contain low
introductory rates or other forms of dual pricing. Bar-Gill, supra note 30, at 1421.
This would be an example of asymmetric paternalism because consumers who need
short-term low rates, and are willing to pay for them with higher future rates, could
solicit such offers from the credit card companies. People who underestimate the
importance of long-term rates will be insulated from the effects of the misjudgments.
303 See Mann, supra note 284, at 899 (advocating banning retroactive price adjust-
ments because such terms are "unpriceable" by the consumer at the time she enters
the credit card contract); Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 240, at 1460 (advocating stan-
dardized terms to help facilitate comparison shopping).
304 Mann, supra note 284, at 927-28.
305 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 84:2
STICKY EXPECTATIONS
In the context of marriage, where expectations are likely to be
highly sticky and debiasing is likely to carry high collateral costs,
policymakers should consider insulation strategies. One promising
insulation strategy would be to change the law of alimony to reflect
spouses' expectations of long-term shared economic ties. In the
employment context, expectations are likely to be significantly less
sticky. Here, relatively simple debiasing techniques could work, obvi-
ating the need to impose penalty-default rules. In the context of
credit cards, the framework that this Article develops highlights the
potential drawbacks of sweeping credit card regulation, and counsels
for a humble approach where policymakers alleviate those costs that
they can, and acknowledge that they may not be able to provide a
complete solution. For these and many other areas where sticky
expectations are likely to exist,30 6 the Calabresian framework provides
a useful starting point to assess both debiasing and insulating
strategies.
306 For example, even equity partners in law firms have sticky expectations about
their partnership rights, which may alter the way that courts should interpret them.
See David B. Wilkins, Partner Shmartner! EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1264, 1264-66, 1268 (2007).
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